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Abstract 
 
 This thesis explores the effects of the Great Depression on the nascent British 
Commonwealth, with particular emphasis on whether economic crisis fostered cooperation or 
division among member states. In doing so, this project resituates our conceptions of the early 
Commonwealth from a purely imperial understanding, to one which considers the 
Commonwealth as a predecessor to modern supranational organisations. Ultimately, the 
Depression exacerbated divisive trends within the Commonwealth, but lingering imperial 
economic and political structures resulted in somewhat begrudging cooperation and coordination 
in response to the crisis. The self-interest of individual states in response to economic crisis, and 
the role of structures in fostering cooperation within supranational organisations are promising 
areas for further research regarding both the early Commonwealth, and the operation of more 
contemporary supranational organisations.  
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Introduction 
1. Preface 
In the past ten years, globalisation and economic crisis have been prevalent themes in the 
Western media. Yet these themes are not new, and their roots arguably extend into a wider 
history of European empires. Since the seventeenth-century in what has been described as 
“proto-globalisation,” these empires helped create the global economic networks of today, as 
well as the foundations of the ever-larger multi-national organisations which govern them.
1
 
Engaging with these roots in the transitionary context of the twentieth-century, the purpose of 
this paper is to explore the impact of large scale economic crisis on supranational organisations. 
More specifically, this paper will consider the impact of the Great Depression on the British 
Empire as it began to transition from Empire to Commonwealth during the interwar period. This 
inquiry will explore whether economic crisis drove the self-governing Dominions of the 
Commonwealth together in cooperation, or apart in self interest.  
At first regard, the Depression did foster cooperation between Britain and the Dominions. 
In the worst years of economic downturn from 1930 to 1932, imperial preferential tariffs and 
economic coordination were created and expanded on an unprecedented scale, culminating with 
the Ottawa Agreements in 1932.  The result was increased trade within the emerging 
Commonwealth and in the British Empire more generally.
2
 Yet the initiatives of the Ottawa 
Conference were not new, many of them having been periodically considered since the 
nineteenth-century. In most cases preferential tariffs were extended unilaterally by the 
                                                          
1
 Linda Colley coined the term “proto-globalisation” in reference to the 18th century British Empire in: The Ordeal 
of Elizabeth Marsh: A Woman in World History (New York: Knopf, 2009). 
2
 From 1933 to 1938 trade between the United Kingdom and the Empire grew 7.9 percent, and intra-imperial trade 
9.3 percent. Forrest Capie, Depression and Protectionism: Britain Between the Wars (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1983), 20. 
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Dominions to Britain, with some partial reciprocation implemented during the First World War. 
Some further limited preferences were offered by Britain in the wake of the conflict, although 
these were generally not new, but extensions of strategically motivated wartime preferences.
3
 
Consequently, from a long-term perspective, the initiatives and cooperation of the Ottawa 
Conference represent a shift in British policy toward the Empire, from limited preferences and 
economic cooperation, to a more comprehensive imperial economic system. The Ottawa 
Conference also represents a shift in Dominion responses to those policies, as they became 
increasingly independent within the emerging structure of the Commonwealth.  
The impact of economic conditions plays a significant role in the context of these policy 
shifts, but these economic factors are bound up in the political and social actions which provide 
an ever-present contextual background in history. Some economic circumstances however, are 
more influential depending on the scope of historical analysis. For example, while a temporary 
market fluctuation may have impacts for an individual family; smaller fluctuations would not 
have the same effect on countries or supranational organisations. While recognising the 
importance of political and social factors in governmental decisions during the interwar period, 
this paper will focus on British economic policy. It would be naive to assert that British 
statesmen were ignorant of the interplay of economic, political and social factors, and the 
evidence suggests that they tried to balance these areas of influence to align with party mandates 
and ideals. However, any work that attempts to consider the interplay of all of these factors 
would be necessarily broader than the scope of this project. As such, while recognising that the 
                                                          
3
 Imperial War Conference 1917: Minutes and Proceedings and Papers Laid Before the Conference, March 1917-
July 1918, (London: Great Britain Public Records Office, 1918), 96, 114. University of Waterloo Microfilm UK1 
PR 18/51., Finance Act 1919., Philip Murphy also argues that interwar cooperation was an abortive attempt to form 
the Empire into a cohesive military power. See: Philip Murphy, “Britain as a Global Power in the Twentieth 
Century,” in Britain’s Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 40-41. 
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British and Dominion governments did consider these multiple factors, this paper will focus 
chiefly on economic policy in the interwar period and will frame that analysis within the existing 
historiography that considers political and social factors in addition to economics.  
2. Definition of Terms 
Much of the literature on the interwar Empire stresses the ongoing economic difficulties 
of Britain throughout the interwar period and thus styles the Depression as a successive phase in 
a wider period of economic distress. While this approach recognises the importance of the 
Depression as a more serious phase of economic distress, it generally denies the Depression the 
infamy it is given by historians studying other countries or regions such as the Americas or 
continental Europe. The understatement of the Depression by some imperial scholars is at first 
consideration a reasonably sound position, as between the World Wars Britain did experience 
continual economic strife. Furthermore, as the mother country of the Empire, British imperial 
policy was developed in the context of those economic troubles. Yet if one considers the 
economic state of the Dominions or other parts of the Empire in the 1920s, the economic woes 
experienced in Britain were not a common imperial experience, as economic conditions varied 
throughout the Empire. Consequently, in light of both the British policy shift precipitated by the 
Depression, and the varied economic experiences of the Dominions, for the purposes of this 
paper the Depression will be considered as an individual event, rather than a phase in a wider 
period of British economic woes.  
For the purpose of clarity the terms with which the diverse political structures of the 
Empire are engaged must also be defined. As a standard basis of reference, the terms “British 
Empire” or “the Empire” refer to the whole of the Empire including the United Kingdom, the 
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self-governing Dominions, as well as the various dependent colonies, territories and 
protectorates. When referring to the Dominions, this paper refers to Australia, Canada, the Irish 
Free State, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and the Union of South Africa. Although the Irish Free 
State would only become a Dominion in 1922, and Newfoundland would later lose its Dominion 
Status, for the purposes of this project this group will be the standard referent for Dominions. It 
is to these countries, along with the United Kingdom, which discussion of the Commonwealth in 
the 1930s refers, as well as the emergent Commonwealth, when referring to the same countries 
in the late 1920s when the grounds for the Commonwealth had been established but not yet 
formalised. The primary difference between the emergent and formalised Commonwealth is the 
concept of free association. The Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the 1926 Imperial 
Conference concluded their report with a definition of freely-associated, legally-equal, self-
governing states.
4
 This definition would later be reaffirmed as the Balfour Declaration which 
unofficially laid the foundations of the Commonwealth. The definition would become official 
with the 1931 Statute of Westminster, in which the initial members of the Commonwealth were 
declared to be a “free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations...united by a common allegiance to the Crown.”5 This distinguished the Commonwealth 
from the emergent Commonwealth in that British laws no longer automatically extended to the 
Dominions, and therefore that their association was not the result of a legal subordination, but 
the choice of the members.
6
   
Throughout this paper there are also occasional references to supranational organisations. 
By supranational organisation, this paper refers to an organisation like the formal 
                                                          
4“Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee,” in Imperial Conference 1926: Summary of Proceedings 
(Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1926), 12.  
5
 Statute of Westminster 1931. 
6
 This differentiation would allow Ireland to leave the Commonwealth in 1938.  
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Commonwealth, comprised of a community of member states that must work together to achieve 
the goals of the wider organisation.
7
 Even after the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which first 
articulated the principles that would be enshrined in the Statute of Westminster; the 
Commonwealth was arguably a supranational organisation in the process of emerging. While a 
structural analysis of the Commonwealth as a supranational organisation is beyond the scope of 
this project, occasional references to the Commonwealth as a supranational organisation are 
included as an effort to resituate our understanding of the Empire. Thus, for the purposes of this 
project, the term supranational organisation is employed as a way to consider the Commonwealth 
in order to stress the association of its members, rather than its cooperation by imperial dictates; 
an approach which lends itself to better understanding the effects of economic crisis on 
supranational organisations, and which encourages a reconsideration of the Commonwealth as a 
predecessor to modern supranational organisations.  
India, as an ever-present exception in British imperial history, is not considered in this 
paper.  Although not a Dominion until after the Second World War, nor an initial member of the 
Commonwealth, India was nonetheless represented alongside the other Dominions at most 
imperial conferences. Much of the source material from the time maintains a dichotomous 
approach that delineates the Dominions and India, always adding unique rules and qualifications 
when considering south Asia. Due to the unique constitutional and economic development, as 
well as representation of India (which is consequently reflected in the documents), India did not 
play a significant role in the system of imperial preference and will therefore not be included in 
this project.  
                                                          
7
 Politico-economic analysts Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley employ a similar definition. See: Todd Sandler and Jon 
Cauley “The Design of Supranational Structures: An Economic Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly 21 
(Jun., 1977), 263. 
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3. Organisation 
To address the aforementioned questions, this paper is organised into four main sections. 
The first section is a historiographical review in order to understand the prevailing explanations 
for the changes of British economic policy and imperial relations in the interwar period. The 
second section of this thesis is comparative, and is comprised of two subsections that will help 
familiarise the reader with key policies of the time. The first of these comparisons illuminates the 
changes in British domestic, foreign, and imperial policy before and after the Depression. The 
second prefaces this paper’s focus of imperial policy by comparing  the 1923 and 1932 Imperial 
Economic Conferences with particular emphasis on their recommendations, tone, and the 
rhetoric of conference discussion and conclusions. This comparison will give a more detailed 
sense of the types of imperial policies in use, as well as the spirit of imperial economic 
coordination before and after the onset of the Depression. This preliminary comparison will 
preface the third main section of this paper; a chronological review of British economic policy 
through the interwar period, which will allow the development of various policies to be traced 
from the  First World War through the Depression. This review will consider British domestic, 
foreign, and imperial economic policy, but will predominantly address imperial policy. 
Considerations of the various imperial conferences of the interwar period will be employed to 
demonstrate the effects of British policy on imperial relations within the emerging 
Commonwealth, and how those effects influenced imperial coordination in response to the 
Depression. The fourth and final section of this paper will tie together the historiography and 
documentary review of the previous sections in order to analyse and draw conclusions about the 
effects of the Depression on imperial economic coordination, and whether economic crisis 
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fostered cooperation or division within the Commonwealth, and what this means for the study of 
the economic relations of supranational organisations.  
This paper’s central argument is that while the Great Depression did cause short term 
cooperation among the members of the Commonwealth, this cooperation only occurred because 
it aligned with the pragmatic self-interest of both Britain and the Dominions. Thus, the 
cooperation brought about by the Depression, while ostensibly a departure from long term trends 
of imperial decentralisation and dispersal, was in reality a practical move drawing from the same 
self-interested forces that were responsible for long-term imperial disengagement.  
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Historiography 
Prior to analysing any documentary evidence, this section will review the historiography 
of the period, presenting various interpretations of the events of the Ottawa Conference and the 
changes in imperial economics during the Depression. The arguments of authors dealing with 
imperial economic policy in the interwar period generally fall into three main groups. The first 
group attributes the policy changes of the period to an ideological struggle in the British 
government between differing economic and imperial visions. This group typically describes 
either a struggle between political parties, namely Labour and the Conservatives, or an 
ideological struggle across party lines between laissez-faire free-traders and imperially minded 
protectionists. The second main interpretive group argues that the policies of the period were an 
outcome of imperial economic and power structures, with the changes of the period derived from 
both consistencies and alterations within the structure of the Empire. The third group focuses on 
the self-interest of the Commonwealth and argues that an imperial economy was a back-up 
system for Britain, and was employed only when other more beneficial avenues of trade became 
untenable.  While authors choose which elements to stress in their respective analyses, there is 
often overlap between these interpretations, and they are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Consequently, this review will focus on the central arguments presented by the various authors, 
while recognising that few authors commit to mono-causal interpretations.  
To begin with a clear example of an ideological and politically focused interpretation, 
Forrest Capie argues in his 1983 book on the Depression and protectionism in interwar Britain, 
that the abandonment of free trade with the introduction of a general tariff in 1932 was not 
simply the product of the Depression, but was the result of a long-term protectionist agenda 
advocated for and implemented by the British Conservative Party. The Conservatives were able 
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to use their dominant position in the coalition national government after 1931, in conjunction 
with the extenuating circumstances of the Depression, to achieve their protectionist agenda, with 
implications for the British domestic, foreign, and imperial economies.
8
 Capie argues that the 
Conservatives were able to exploit these factors to facilitate the shift to a more protectionist 
imperial economy. He further argues that this shift took place within the nationalistic context of 
the time, which was complementary to isolationism and protectionism.
9
 Capie makes a 
compelling case, particularly considering that during the British election in 1929, prior to the 
Depression, the Conservative government, although it lost to Labour, incorporated imperial 
preference as a key component of the draft of the prime minister’s election address for 1929. 
Although this was before the Depression and the speech would not be used, it demonstrates that 
the Conservatives were predisposed to a protectionist economy rooted in the Empire.
10
 
Another historian who frames analysis of the economic events of the interwar period as 
the result of actions by British political parties is Robert Blake. Blake argues that party policies 
during the Depression were eclectic and often divisive because they sought to combine and 
balance motivations of ideology, party survival, and logical responses to external events, often 
resulting in ambiguous compromises within the policies themselves.
11
 Overall however, he 
outlines that the Liberal party advocated for a Keynesian system based on free trade, the 
Conservatives advocated for protectionism and low taxes, and Labour, advocating for primarily 
                                                          
8
 Capie, Depression and Protectionism, 7, 45, 58.  
9
Ibid., 142-3. 
10
 The National Archives (TNA): CAB 24/203, CP 141(29), Emergency Business Committee, Draft of the Prime 
Minister’s Election Address 1929, 7 May, 1929. This position is even more compelling if we accept D.K. 
Fieldhouse’s argument that imperial preference could not be implemented from Britain until the Depression was at 
its worst, supporting Capie’s view that the Conservatives were pro-protection even in the 1920s, but were only able 
to commit to limited measures until the more extreme economic context of the Depression. See: D.K. Fieldhouse, 
“The Metropolitan Economics of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV, The Twentieth 
Century, eds. Judith M. Brown, Wm. Roger, Louis and Alaine Low (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 90.  
11
 Robert Blake, The Paladin History of England: The Decline of Power, 1915-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 139-40. 
10 
 
working class voters, was divided over commitment to free trade and lower food prices, versus 
social welfare with higher taxes.
12
 After detailing the onset of the Depression and the 
accompanying crisis in the British government, Blake concludes that the Conservatives 
outmanoeuvred opposition first to bring down the divided Labour government by aligning with 
the Liberal party, then to use its dominant position within the new national government to create 
a protectionist economy.
13
 This protectionist economy, while engaging with the Empire during 
the Depression, ultimately destroyed the old colonial model of economics by institutionalising 
Dominion nationalism to the point of no return, thus sowing the seeds for further dissociation of 
the Empire.
14
 Blake’s approach is decidedly political, focusing exclusively on politics within the 
British government, and considering economic forces only in relation to their political effects. 
When discussing imperial developments, he also subordinates these to the outcomes of party 
politics in Britain. Although there is a case to be made for the subordination of imperial concerns 
to British domestic politics, Blake takes this interpretation to an extreme degree, arguing for 
example, that the Ottawa Agreements were an entirely symbolic measure to solidify the Statute 
of Westminster.
15
 If this were the case, it seems doubtful that the Dominions would have 
negotiated so intensely for a simple symbolic verification of their newfound independence. 
Furthermore, this interpretation does not consider the increase in imperial trade following the 
Ottawa Agreements. The value of this increase in trade has also been disputed, but it would be 
naive to disregard it altogether. Thus, while Blake provides a superb analysis of the complexities 
of interwar party politics in Britain, he does so at the expense of economic and imperial context.    
                                                          
12
 Ibid.,140. 
13
 Ibid., 153-5, 162, 167. A position also expressed by contemporaries. See: Arnold J. Toynbee and V.M. Boulter, 
Survey of International Affairs, 1931 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), 128. 
14
 Ibid., 168. Blake also recognised the role of the Statute of Westminster in cementing Dominion nationalism. 
15
 Ibid., 168. 
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Frank Trentmann’s interpretation of the changes in the interwar period also incorporates 
ideology as a key factor, but focuses on ideology less as an element of party politics and more as 
a wider influence on ideas of citizenship within the Empire. Trentmann argues the First World 
War, and later the Depression called into question the capacity of nation-states to respond to 
crises, and that therefore, larger international organisations were considered as a viable 
alternative.
16
 However, he specifies that the idealists advocating for a new internationalism 
needed to divorce ideas of state and nationality, differing between political citizenship and a 
sense of national identity.
17
 In the 1920s, there was a strong effort by these international idealists 
in Britain to foster a sense of imperial patriotism, moving to a Commonwealth, rather than 
national footing for member citizens’ identities.18 While noting that such idealism was 
disconnected from the reality of a period often characterised by division and nationalism, 
Trentmann concludes that idealistic thinking nonetheless pressured policy makers to move 
toward closer imperial union in the 1920s.
19
 This argument emphasizes culturally-underscored 
ideological pressures for the difference between 1920s and 1930s imperial relations, rather than 
the economic problems of the Depression. Trentmann argues that the latter helped create the 
conditions in which that ideology grew, but were not as instrumental in pushing policy makers to 
attempt to reconcile civic spirit with commercial and imperial society.
20
 While Trentmann’s 
position is a compelling argument for the intellectual history of internationalism and ideas of 
                                                          
16
 Many of these idealists aligned with Labour in its pursuit of closer international cooperation through the League 
of Nations. See: Lucian M. Ashworth, “Rethinking a Socialist Foreign Policy: The British Labour Party and 
International Relations Experts, 1918 to 1931,” International Labor and Working-Class History 75 (Spring 2009), 
30-31. 
17
 Frank Trentmann, “After the Nation State: Citizenship, Empire and Global Coordination in the New 
Internationalism, 1914-1930,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950, eds. 
Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 36-7. 
18
 Ibid., 47-48. See also John E. Kindle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1975), 303. 
19
 Ibid., 50. 
20
 Ibid., 44. 
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imperial citizenship, his interpretation understates the gravity of the Depression, which arguably 
had more impact on political parties and citizens than the idealistic thinking it helped create.
21
 
This emphasis on differing visions of the Empire’s role in the world, often characterised 
as an idealistically driven pursuit of either open free trade, or a more closed, yet comprehensive 
imperial system, is reflected by other authors as well, particularly when interpreted in light of the 
Second World War. For example, Ronald Hyam argues that the interwar period was a struggle 
across party lines between free-market idealists arguing for gold-standard based free trade, and 
imperial visionaries looking for a closed, but self sufficient imperial economy.
22
 He further 
argues that through this struggle, the establishment of the Commonwealth and the Ottawa 
Agreements provided just enough constitutional independence, and just enough increase in trade 
volume to ensure that the Empire stayed together. These measures were ultimately successful not 
because of their economic and constitutional outcomes, but because they prepared the self-
governing Empire for the coordination and idealistic cooperation needed to ensure success in the 
upcoming war.
23
 While the characterisation of this period as a struggle between free market and 
imperial idealists is a relatively common interpretation, Hyam’s argument differs in that, while it 
                                                          
21
 That being said, Trentmann is not the only one to argue for intellectual factors as the root of policy. For example, 
A.P. Thorton deals extensively with idealism, and argues that the Empire was founded on a unique combination of 
politics and emotion, and only declined when it ceased to believe in its perceived position in the world. See: A.P. 
Thorton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1959), xii-
xiv.  A similar point is made by B.W.E. Alford, Britain in the World Economy Since 1880 (London: Longman 
Group Limited, 1996), 150. 
22
 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 72-73.  
23
 Ibid., 69, 73. Hyam’s argument is reminiscent of Second World War propaganda, with the ideals of 
Commonwealth cooperation styled as the most important aspect of Commonwealth development in the interwar 
period.  For example, see: Ramsay Muir, The British Empire, How it Grew and How it Works (Toronto: Periscope 
Publishing Company, 1940), 4-5, 35, 50, 64.  
13 
 
recognises the involvement of political and economic factors, it subordinates the outcomes of the 
period to the role of ideologies.
24
 
Ian Drummond also argues that interwar imperial economics were dictated by an 
ideological struggle across party lines between laissez-faire free traders and imperial visionaries 
in Britain.
25
 Drummond incorporates economic analysis by recognising that no self-governing 
members of the Empire could fill one another’s needs, and that all were buying more foreign 
than imperial goods even after the implementation of imperial preference following the Ottawa 
Conference.
26
 However, he also argues that an imperial economy was still attractive for the 
security it offered for strategic self-sufficiency, as well as for tariff protection for domestic 
producers in member states, and as a framework for safe overseas investments.
27
 This 
Commonwealth-focused policy would help Britain though the Depression but, as international 
tensions mounted, would ultimately be sacrificed in the late 1930s in order to gain political 
“goodwill” from both the independence seeking Dominions, and international partners.28 He also 
argues that the imperial economic system would be abandoned not only for political purposes in 
the late 1930s, but also due to a lack of clear economic benefits from imperial preference. 
Although this analysis seems much less ideologically based than Drummond’s initial 
characterisation of a cross-party ideological struggle would imply, he returns to that theme at the 
end of this work. In concluding, he argues that the British commitment to free-trade had 
                                                          
24
 For example, see: Stephen Constantine, Unemployment in Britain Between the Wars (London: Longman Group 
Limited, 1980), 78. 
25
 Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1972), 36., Ian M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1919-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974),  424. This point is also echoed by Jim Tomlinson in: “The 
Empire/Commonwealth in British Economic Thinking and Policy,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, 
Britain’s Experience in the Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
219. 
26
 Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 21, 23, 103.  
27
 Ibid., 37. 
28
 Ibid., 140. 
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persisted throughout the Depression, and had even manifested itself within the imperial economy 
by a push towards Empire free trade within the protected imperial system. Thus, the ongoing 
struggle of imperial, versus free trade visionaries continued as the context to Drummond’s more 
analytical review of the intervening events. 
29
 
With the exception of Drummond, these more ideologically based works tend to exclude 
many of the economic factors of the period when accounting for changes in imperial policy. 
Other historians, however, argue that while ideology had an important role, colonial economic 
structures limited the ways in which that ideology could be manifested through economic policy. 
Consequently, the policy changes of the interwar period were less a result of ideology and its 
manifestation in party politics, but were the product of structural problems inherent to colonial 
economics of centre and periphery. Stephen Constantine’s work on colonial development policy 
during the interwar period is a useful example of this type of argument. Constantine posits that in 
regards to development policy, the vision for economic development in the colonies was 
ultimately undermined by the domestic need to solve British unemployment.
30
 This political 
obligation for the British government to be accountable to its domestic electorate, all the while 
attempting to manage an overseas empire meant that colonial economic needs would always be 
subordinate to British self interest by virtue of the domestic vote.
31
 The same applied to the 
Dominions as too much industrial development would mean internal competition between 
Britain and other parts of the Empire, thus putting the development and recovery of both at odds 
should they remain in a closed imperial system. In this case, the colonial economic model 
                                                          
29
 Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 390, 433, 446.  
30
 Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940 (London: Frank Cass and 
Company Limited, 1984), 113., Stephen Constantine ed., Emigrants and Empire: British Settlement in the 
Dominions Between the Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 6.  
31
 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 220-221., See also: Richard Whiting, “The 
Empire and British Politics,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Britain’s Experience in the Twentieth 
Century ed. Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 161.  
15 
 
dictated that the interests of the metropole would take precedent; a structural caveat which 
arguably sparked many of the constitutional debates of the interwar period.
32
 Constantine makes 
a similar case in his analysis of unemployment in Britain during the interwar period. He argues 
that the nature of the British economy as an export based system rendered unemployment a 
structural problem with no easy solution.
33
 In the context of this problem Constantine argues that 
that the Conservative party helped destroy the old economic orthodoxy of gold-standard based 
free trade by advocating for a protectionist economy sheltered within the Empire.
34
 However, he 
concludes that imperial visionaries did not consider Dominion independence in their assumptions 
of the Empire, and as such the trends of imperial economic cooperation began to reverse in the 
late 1930s.
35
 Both an export-reliant economy and assumptions of Dominion subordination are 
hallmarks of a metropolitan state and features of a colonial economic system. Thus, the changes 
of the interwar period represent a reactionary attempt by the British government to adapt an older 
style colonial economy to the new economic conditions of the Depression. This type of 
structurally based argument correlates strongly with the forthcoming documentary analysis.  
The structural inequalities of this type of colonial model persisted even as the Dominions 
acquired increasing political and economic independence, bringing to mind J.D.B. Miller’s 
position that in the Commonwealth, equal status was not the same as equal stature.
36
 Miller 
argues that in a colonial economic model Britain exported not only manufactured goods, but also 
                                                          
32
 David Meredith, “The British Government and Colonial Economic Policy, 1919-39,” The Economic History 
Review 28 (August 1975), 485, 495., Constantine ed., Emigrants and Empire, 13. 
33
 Constantine, Unemployment in Britain Between the Wars, 14. 
34
 Ibid., 71. 
35
 ibid., 73-74, 78. 
36
 J.D.B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1966), 41., See also: Nicholas 
Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931-1939 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1952), 34. 
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knowledge and influence without much return in this regard.
37
 This had resulted in a system in 
which the Dominions’ financial and cultural life was inherently linked to Britain, but that at 
home, Britons had little understanding of the Empire due to the largely unilinear outflow that had 
defined the colonial system up to the First World War.
38
 Consequently, while attempting to react 
to the Depression according to more traditional norms, the British Government often misread 
Dominion motivations, assuming an older form of colonial loyalty which was no longer 
automatic. Conversely, as the Dominions sought to respond to the Depression with the new 
independence of Commonwealth equality, they found themselves unable to do so without 
coordination with Britain, which remained the economic hub for the self-governing Dominions. 
Miller recognises that due to the growth of free trade, economic links between Britain and the 
Dominions were imbalanced and could never provide enough for the expanding needs of both, 
yet due to a lingering colonial style economic structure, those links were retained, and relied 
upon during the Depression.
39
 
Another historian to argue for structural causes to the changes brought about with the 
Depression is John Gallagher. In his 1974 Ford Lectures on The Decline Revival and Fall of the 
British Empire, Gallagher argued that the structure of the British Empire based on free trade 
emphasised the informal Empire, which was governed largely by informal commercial ties rather 
than direct rule, with the difference being in degree, not structure per se.
40
 Gallagher argues that 
the colonial system was designed to cater to the interests of the metropole, and that the British 
people and government were relatively ignorant of conditions in the Empire, and did not 
recognise the realities of Dominion independence, nor take those developments seriously as they 
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unfolded.
41
 This position aptly sums up the domestic implications of the ideological struggles of 
the period. As competing visionary groups propagating their ideas in the United Kingdom, 
Britons were presented with totalising views that simplified and sometimes whitewashed the 
complexities of the Empire into publicly consumable visions. The result was a period of stronger, 
though frequently less informed imperial interest groups vying to sway British policy without 
necessarily considering local conditions throughout the Empire.
42
 Gallagher concludes that the 
British government had become short sighted and reactionary, with limited responses to both 
unexpected economic crises and political backlash from the Empire in the wake of the First 
World War. However, he posits that in spite of the Dominion and colonial pressures brought to 
bear against an ignorant Britain, the interlocking external pressures of economic collapse and the 
threat of war in the 1930s ultimately brought solidarity to the Empire by simultaneously pushing 
Britain to seek imperial cooperation based on a colonial economic model that offered the most 
gain to Britain, and by urging the Dominions to cooperate with Britain primarily for non-
economic reasons such as defence.
43
 Gallagher’s interpretation incorporates many sub 
arguments, but at the base he nonetheless argues that the structure of the Empire set the stage for 
expanded imperial cooperation in the 1930s by pushing its members together, whether for 
political or economic reasons. This argument of a reluctant coming together of the Empire can 
readily be seen in the debates of the Ottawa Conference which, while much more heated and 
divisive than the cordial cooperation of the 1923 Conference, nonetheless resulted in a 
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comprehensive system of imperial preference being implemented and imperial trade increasing 
thereafter. 
Lorna Lloyd also engages with notions of British economic pragmatism and ignorance of 
conditions in the Dominions.
44
 Her arguments on economics are framed in an overall focus on 
the constitutional relations of the emergent Commonwealth, with strong emphasis on the 
doctrine of inter-se and imperial diplomacy. However, within that framework she incorporates 
the argument that while Britain sought economic coordination with the Dominions in response to 
the Depression, the Dominions lacked the economic and diplomatic machinery to operate 
independently, and were thus tied to the imperial economic structure.
45
 However, 
Commonwealth constitutional developments had equipped the Dominions to develop their own 
diplomatic and commercial networks; the implications of which Britain did not fully consider.  
Consequently, Britain increasingly relied on economic coordination with the Dominions, all the 
while giving the legal freedom for the Dominions to dismantle the old interdependent imperial 
economy. Within this dichotomous approach the tendency to pursue a free trade economy 
remained strong during the 1930s, but was sheltered in a protected imperial economy which 
allowed British economic institutions to be preserved until such time as world market conditions 
improved.
46
 According to Lloyd, structurally facilitated imperial economic coordination did help 
member states during the crisis, but had more impact in terms of their political rather than 
economic outcomes. In spite of closer economic ties during the Depression, those ties were 
accompanied by novel constitutional freedom that would allow the economic ties to be 
dismantled in future. Thus, the next time economic conditions permitted full pursuit toward free 
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trade, the stage had been set for further imperial economic disengagement, without the structural 
ties that encouraged cooperation during the Depression.
47
 
Although placing more emphasis on British self-interest than a colonial style economy, 
B.W.E. Alford argues a similar position that Britain operated out of self-interest both 
internationally, and within the imperial system. In the process, he argues, the British government 
greatly underestimated the self-interest of the Dominions, which resulted in no small friction 
both constitutionally, and in the economic proceedings of the Ottawa Conference.
48
 Alford 
continues to argue that between world and Empire economies, the cultural similarities with the 
Dominions lent much more confidence to Empire trade at a time when economic confidence was 
sorely needed.
49
 However, he elaborates that reliance on an imperial economy, while attractive, 
could only work to a certain extent as Dominion growth would inherently compete with the 
British-self interest built into the system and thus, the imperial economy would require structural 
change in order to accommodate the new economic realities of the increasingly independent 
Empire.
50
  
Alford’s interpretation, as well as those of Constantine, Miller, Gallagher, and Lloyd, 
suggests that in spite of divergent developments since the First World War, such as the growing 
constitutional and economic independence of the Dominions, latent colonial economic structures 
pushed the Empire together, if begrudgingly so. Britain maintained the economic dominance of 
the metropole, but could offer some compensation in the realm of defence. The imperial system 
was less valuable to Britain than freer world trade because the Empire could be economically 
self-sufficient, but self-sufficiency did not create the surpluses possible in world trade, thus 
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rendering it secure, but less profitable.
51
  The pursuit of freer trade had somewhat alienated the 
Dominions after the promises of the 1917 Imperial Conference, resulting in the apparent 
bitterness of the Ottawa negotiations.  An initial unwillingness to cooperate existed in both the 
United Kingdom, and particularly in the Dominions.  However, the results of the conference 
ultimately increased Empire trade due to the external effects of the Depression coupled with the 
internal effects of older colonial economic structures.  
Another common interpretive framework for the shift in British economic policy and 
imperial economic relations as a result of the Depression is that British policy makers kept the 
imperial economy as a backup system, or a sort of economic insurance policy in case of global 
economic deterioration. By juggling world and imperial economics in the 1920s, Britain sought 
to achieve maximum economic benefit in world markets, all the while maintaining the security 
offered by an in-house imperial system. This argument is quite compelling in light of the high-
points of imperial economic cooperation during the early twentieth-century. For example, during 
the First World War restrictions to world trade resulted in an expanded, but not comprehensive 
imperial economic system. Later, the shift to a much more complete imperial economy during 
the Depression represented the alternative imperial economic system being brought to the fore as 
other commercial channels failed on an unprecedented scale.
52
 This interpretation is not 
exclusive of the role of lingering colonial economic structures; however, it allocates more agency 
to the British government, styling the shift to imperial economics as a decision to use a back-up 
system, rather than a structurally dictated response.  
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Charles Kindleberger echoes this argument in his 1986 survey of the Depression. He 
argues that the gravity of the Depression was the result of British inability and American 
unwillingness to stabilise the international economy.
53
 Consequently, the British government 
shifted economic priority to the Commonwealth only after it was demonstrably shown that 
British economic leadership could not rally the world economy. Thus, imperial trade was 
employed as an economic backup system to protect British economic institutions until conditions 
improved and free-trade could be revisited.
54
 Although Kindleberger’s work is rather broad in 
that it seeks to address the Depression throughout the world, in his discussion of Britain and 
imperial economics, particularly in regards to Commonwealth coordination, his approach aptly 
sums up the view of the Empire as a back-up economy for Britain, both as a primary channel for 
trade, and a platform from which to rebuild the world economy. 
D.K. Fieldhouse, in a more comprehensively Empire-focused work, also argues that the 
Empire served as an emergency backup economy for Britain, even going so far as to say that due 
to the benefits of free trade, when faced with the choice between an open world or closed 
imperial economy, the choice of an imperial economy was not politically possible in Britain until 
the Depression was at its worst.
55
 After the high point of imperial trade in the wake of the Ottawa 
Conference, Fieldhouse argues that the gradual re-opening of world trade in the late 1930s 
undermined the nascent sterling area and associated Empire trading bloc, as it posed fewer limits 
on potential growth, and was without the defence and bureaucratic costs of imperial maintenance 
and governance. By allowing British investors to shop around and potentially increase returns on 
their investments, foreign trade drew capital out of the imperial system to be redistributed abroad 
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allowing free trade to quickly reassert itself and regain British economic priority in the late 
1930s.
56
 He concludes that the Empire had always contributed to the British economy and did so 
even more during the Depression, making it difficult to determine how Britain would have fared 
without falling back to the imperial economy during the crisis.
57
   
P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins also argue that the Empire served as a backup economy for 
Britain. Cain and Hopkins frame this argument in a long-term perspective of British governance. 
Thus, rather than a simple emergency backup economy, they style the Empire as an alternative to 
a cosmopolitan economy that Britain was trying to build in the wake of the First World War. 
Within this framework, they argue that the imperial economy would not provide the growth 
sought by Britain, but would protect British economic systems through the turbulence of a 
changing world economy, and was therefore important to maintain in case of economic 
collapse.
58
 They elaborate that the Depression forced economic interdependence to a high degree 
which could provided self sufficiency, but not enough surplus capital for growth, and would 
therefore never be seen as a permanent solution.
59
 That interdependence was formalised with the 
Ottawa Agreements and promoted a reliance on the sterling zone as the financial basis of a 
commercial system rooted in the Empire.
60
 Cain and Hopkins emphasise the vitality of interwar 
Britain in this regard, as it remained a world power, improved and expanded the sterling 
currency bloc, and retook markets from the United States in the Americas and Asia.
61
 This 
interpretation again engages with the concepts of the Empire as a backup economic system that 
                                                          
56
 Ibid., 91,111. 
57
 Ibid., 112-3.  
58
 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 73. 
59
 Ibid., 38, 112, 139, 145.  
60
 Ibid., 38-39.  
61
 Ibid., 6.  
23 
 
was effectively used as a last resort in the depths of the Depression, but was limited to that 
purpose and later replaced.  
Moving from the notion of the Empire as a back-up economy yet still engaging with 
wider trends, Nicholas Mansergh, in his work on problems of British external policy in the 
1930s, argues that Commonwealth interactions were coloured by the skeptical spirit of the age. 
This led the Dominions to be suspicious of British authority and all parties to harbour 
protectionist sentiments like their contemporaries abroad.
62
 Addressing the period in long-term 
trends, he argues that the time between the wars was one of transition in which the Dominions 
were gaining independence, yet were not fully equipped for autonomy, and therefore were forced 
to rely on Britain until they could build up the diplomatic and economic machinery for full 
independence.
63
 Mansergh uses these observations to explain the origins of appeasement in the 
1930s, rather than the more economic issues addressed by this paper. However, his overarching 
framework of long-term trends, and his arguments on the establishment of the Commonwealth 
and Empire relations in the interwar period are useful to understanding how the Empire 
functioned in the early 1930s.  Mansergh’s observations about the spirit and transitory nature of 
the interwar period are framed in the still wider narrative of the triumph of imperial 
decentralisation, which had begun much earlier and arguably encompasses most of the intricacies 
of Commonwealth development, and even decolonisation.
64
 Mansergh’s focus on such a long-
term, macro scale narrative offers another frame of reference for this thesis’ assessment of 
whether interwar imperial economic cooperation was the result of long-term trends or a response 
to the Depression alone. While Mansergh does address reactions to the Depression, he sees them 
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as smaller manifestations of long-term trends of decentralisation.  He evaluates whether the 
Depression itself had a significant impact on imperial cooperation, or whether it was simply one 
of many avenues through which macro-level trends were manifested.
65
 Although macro-level 
trends are engaged with by other historians, Mansergh places much more importance on these 
long-term themes; an approach which is valuable to wider understanding, but must be balanced 
with the role of reactionary responses to short-term events. 
John Darwin, having written much on the interwar Empire, provides perhaps some of the 
most nuanced interpretations of the changes of this period, particularly in regards to balancing 
macro- and micro-level intricacies of the time. In his 2009 book, The Empire Project: the Rise 
and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970, he details the British struggle to maintain free 
trade and the gold standard, and the establishment of imperial preference as a turn to illiberal 
solutions in the face of crisis.
66
 Darwin argues that imperial economics, while valuable, could not 
be a full solution to the Depression, and that the nationalist currents of the time were driving the 
Dominions apart. Due to these factors by the late 1930s the idea of a closed imperial economy 
was in decline.
67
 Adopting a long-term view akin to that of Mansergh, he ultimately argues that 
long term geopolitical forces outside of British control dictated the rise and fall of the imperial 
system in the interwar period.
68
 In The End of the British Empire: the Historical Debate, Darwin 
also argues that all British governments were prone to allowing gradual disengagement with the 
Empire.
69
 In this work, however, he specifies that within this trend, the Labour government, 
when interacting with the Dominions, preferred to promote the Commonwealth as a basis of 
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cooperation, thus allowing independence and reducing the British commitment to the Empire, 
particularly in terms of administrative costs.
70
 Darwin argues that the Conservatives were much 
more focused on national pragmatism, and as such, sought a protectionist system rooted in the 
Empire solely for the preservation of British economic machinery. He further argues that as time 
went by and global geopolitical conditions made empires increasingly untenable, the 
Conservatives would prefer allowing the Empire to dissolve in the name of pragmatism, rather 
than transforming it into a new type of association such as the Commonwealth.
71
 This argument 
coincides well with the general non-committal stance of all British governments, and does well 
to explain why the national government after 1931, comprised mostly of Labour and 
Conservative members, granted increased political independence to the Dominions, all the while 
pursuing a more protective imperial economy. Labour’s preference for a freely associated 
Commonwealth and the Conservative desire for a protectionist economy were not mutually 
exclusive when implemented in the form of the Ottawa Agreements. Darwin concludes this 
survey by arguing that the decline of the British Empire could not have been mono-causal, and 
that a combination of factors undoubtedly resulted in its dissolution.
72
 
Darwin emphasises multi-causal explanations for the changes of the interwar period 
which incorporate the politics of ideology as well as economic and structural factors not only in 
these, but also his other works. For example, in “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in 
Imperial Politics,” written as a contribution to The Oxford History of the British Empire,  Darwin 
traces the history of the idea of dominionhood, arguing that imperial unity was a key concern in 
the turbulent first half of the twentieth-century. He elaborates that at its core, the dominion idea 
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was developed to help foster political, economic, and defence cooperation to help the Empire 
survive.
73
 The First World War brought about a change in thought wherein the Dominions came 
to be viewed as assets rather than liabilities, and imperial preference was implemented as part of 
a programme for imperial unity, which incorporated defence interests as well as appeals to 
British race sentiment.
74
 Darwin concludes that dominionhood was designed to be a platform for 
global proxy power for a renewed and modernised British Empire, but that the possibility was 
lost during the Second World War.
75
 Much like Cain and Hopkins, in this work Darwin 
emphasises British vitality between the wars, and considers economics as part of a wider British 
programme of power politics. This programme incorporated the Empire as a key piece of a wider 
global project, rather than the Empire itself being the ultimate project, thus explaining the British 
tendency to subordinate the Empire to more profitable free-market preferences, yet promote 
imperial ties for more viable defence and cultural links. 
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The Impact of the Depression through Policy Comparison 
  To trace British economic policy through the interwar period reveals a preoccupation 
with two overarching and interconnected goals. These were to reduce domestic unemployment, 
and to promote freer world trade as the primary method of reducing unemployment in the British 
export sector. This section will briefly recapitulate the changes and similarities in British 
economic policy through the Depression. Following this general summary of policy, this thesis 
will focus on analysing the differences and continuities in imperial policy in particular, and its 
consequences for, the cooperation of the emergent Commonwealth in the face of economic 
crisis. 
1. British Economic Policy 
A. British Domestic Economic Policy 
Bearing in mind the overarching goals of addressing unemployment in Britain and 
working toward international free trade, British domestic economic policy for the purposes of 
this paper is a lesser but key contextual consideration. From the end of the First World War 
onwards, this area of policy had four main branches used to combat unemployment in Britain: 
public works, land settlement, unemployment insurance, and industrial reorganisation.  
In the 1920s, public works projects began relatively limited in scope and were seen as a 
temporary measure to ease unemployment until prosperity returned, as per the assumptions of 
cyclical economics. These projects mostly featured infrastructure development such as roads, 
housing, and port upgrades, but were generally on a small scale. By 1925, Labour was 
advocating for a more active role of the government in resolving unemployment, including 
increased public works; a policy which the party pursued once in office in 1929, though in a 
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limited way.
76
 After 1932, when it became clear that the Depression was much more than a 
cyclical downturn of the economy and required more drastic responses, public works projects 
were greatly expanded to incorporate a larger variety of projects and to include more workers. 
Overall, public works were viewed both before and after the onset of the Depression as a 
temporary measure, but became much more institutionalised in the 1930s.
77
  
Land settlement was a scheme designed during the War to provide for ex-servicemen, 
and later unemployed and poor families, all the while contributing in some small way to British 
agricultural production.
78
 This scheme involved clearing land throughout the United Kingdom 
and revitalising it as small farms, which could provide work and food for unemployed families 
and thus relieve some of the burden on the state’s newly minted welfare system. After 1932 this 
policy was continued, but to a much lesser degree. This was probably due to the limited amount 
of land to be used, and the inability of the government to guarantee a standard living wage for 
these novice farmers. Overall this policy was an effort of the 1920s with inherent limits to its 
effectiveness, which demonstrated that it could not provide effective relief to the numbers of 
unemployed in the 1930s. In both rhetoric and practice, this policy faded with the worsening of 
the Depression. 
Unemployment insurance was arguably the largest domestic relief effort in both the 
1920s and 1930s. Immediately following the First World War, unemployment insurance was 
expanded from its earlier forms, largely to provide for demobilised soldiers as they transitioned 
back into a civil economy. Yet this system was founded on assumptions of cyclical 
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unemployment, and was stymied by the persisting downturn of the 1920s. As mass 
unemployment persisted through the decade, the breadth of the programme was continually 
expanded to accommodate those affected by unemployment.
79
 However, while unemployment 
insurance was extended to increasing numbers of people and people groups, these revisions were 
often based on debates over eligibility and criteria for exclusion, which permitted the expansion 
of the programme, but with limitations and hesitance at times. After 1932, unemployment 
insurance was maintained and expanded as per yearly needs, and was periodically updated and 
consolidated to include ever-finer categories of citizens, with a preoccupation for not excluding 
those deserving of aid, yet cautious about potential abuses of the system. The change in this 
policy could be characterized by construction of welfare systems in the 1920s followed by 
extensive growth and fine tuning of that system with the advent of the Depression. 
Finally, British domestic economic policy incorporated a strong component of industrial 
reorganisation. Initially, this was a limited policy focused on textiles, steel, and coal mining and 
was designed to modernise British industry so as to increase its competitiveness in world export 
markets. Rationalisation and modernisation were buzzwords of the 1920s. However, this policy 
area was limited as the economic orthodoxy of the day encouraged waiting for trade to rebound 
in a cyclical fashion.
80
 During the Depression, this area of policy was adapted to the reality that 
Britain’s export economy was not simply experiencing a cyclical slump, but had much more 
deep-rooted problems. Consequently, in the 1930s industrial reorganisation was expanded and 
began to focus not only on modernisation to revitalise existing, largely export based industries, 
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but also diversification.
81
 This strategy would increase British domestic markets, reducing the 
economic reliance on continual exports and create new industries and more employment. 
Interestingly enough, as economic conditions improved in the late 1930s, industrial 
reorganisation was not so heavily emphasised in legislation and discussion, no doubt due to the 
success of previous reforms, but also because as world economic conditions improved, the need 
to reform a still predominantly export economy had passed.  
B. British International Economic Policy 
In terms of international policy, the years before and after the onset of the Depression 
make an interesting comparison not only in terms of large-scale policy changes, but also in 
regards to the persistence of certain ideas. British international economic policy in this period 
can be characterised by the two central themes of gold-standard based currency and the 
advocation of freer international trade. While international and imperial policy often overlapped, 
for the purposes of this section they will be regarded individually.  
In the wake of the First World War, the return to gold standard currency was a goal that 
was optimistically pursued as a prospective cure for Britain’s mounting problem of 
unemployment. Having been abandoned during the War, economic orthodoxy assumed that its 
reestablishment in 1925 would boost the global economy, reassert British financial dominance 
abroad and subsequently bring about domestic recovery.
82
 Yet even as this recovery failed to 
materialise and conditions worsened after the arrival of the Depression, the gold standard was 
maintained until a lack of alternatives forced the issue and precipitated a change of government 
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and the abandonment of the gold-standard.
83
 Unlike domestic policy in which existing policies 
were generally adapted to the exigencies of the Depression, the abandonment of the gold-
standard represented a fundamental switch in British policy which was in this case permanent. 
This shift from gold standard based sterling to cheaper money was a significant departure not 
only in the composition of British currency, but also in terms of international economic strategy. 
The gold standard represented a bid to direct international finance based on a fiscal domination 
of continental Europe. This was to be accomplished by maintaining a strong pound, which was 
ultimately impossible due lack of recovery and cooperation among European countries, and 
because of the domestic effects a high-valued pound had in contributing British unemployment.
84
 
With sterling, this bid for world financial leadership was transferred to the sterling zone, largely 
based in, but not exclusively centred in the Empire. This major policy shift caused by the 
Depression was permanent, and had important repercussions for the role of British finance 
domestically, as it helped precipitate the establishment of a Keynesian system in Britain, as well 
as redefined Britain’s position in world and Commonwealth financial coordination from the 
Depression to after the Second World War.
85
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The most prominent international policy was a commitment to promoting free 
international trade. The British commitment to free trade was well entrenched in policy and had 
become a bastion of British economic orthodoxy since the nineteenth century. The departure 
from free trade to a protected system employing tariff barriers was a fundamental change in 
British policy that was unprecedented in its scale. The implementation of the general tariff in 
1932 made Britain a protectionist state and precipitated a move from an open world system to a 
more closed, but not isolated imperial system. However, unlike the abandonment of the gold 
standard, although British policy had made a significant change with the implementation of a 
general tariff, the ideas of free trade persisted within the new system, often emerging in debates, 
caveats, and conditions on imperial trade. The persistence of free trade ideas demonstrates that 
while significant, this was a temporary policy departure in reaction to the Depression. British 
policy makers’ increasing reversion to free-trade rhetoric in the later 1930s is further evidence 
for the temporary nature of this shift.
86
 As world economics improved in the late 1930s, the 
rhetoric of free trade was proportionally reprised, as demonstrated at the 1937 Imperial 
Conference, when the principle of Commonwealth cooperation to remove international trade 
barriers was a prominent feature of conference speeches. The more political details of this 
cooperation as a means to promote appeasement and world peace were the primary subject of 
discussion, with the bulk of economic considerations relegated to bilateral negotiations.
87
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C. Imperial Economic Policy 
The third main area of British economic policy in the interwar period, and the most 
important for the purposes of this paper was imperial policy. Imperial economic policies were 
centred on what Australian statesman Stanley Bruce described as men, money, and markets, or 
imperial settlement, imperial investment/development, and trade facilitated through imperial 
preferential tariffs.
88
  
The first of these policies, Empire settlement, like domestic land settlement, was one born 
of the First World War. Originally designed to resettle veterans throughout the Empire, it grew to 
include the wider British population. Through the 1920s it increasingly became a policy used to 
relieve unemployment in Britain by exporting the unemployed for agricultural work in the 
Dominions.
89
 This policy was ambitiously pursued by the British government in the 1920s, and 
cautiously received by the Dominions depending on the state of their domestic economies. 
However, by 1932 the policy was still technically in place, but was abruptly curtailed due to 
worsening economic conditions in the Dominions which greatly lowered, if not destroyed their 
capacity to absorb new workers. Cabinet recognised the usefulness of Empire settlement to 
Britain for both its capacity to reduce British unemployment and to promote the cultural 
homogeneity of the Dominions (thus supporting imperial strategic interests) but the policy was 
nonetheless abandoned for the duration of the Depression. However, although the policy was 
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relegated to the periphery for the worst of the Depression, it was resurrected by 1937 once world 
economic conditions began to improve.
90
 
Imperial development projects and investment in the Empire underwent a similar change 
with the onset of the Depression. In the 1920s, investment and imperial development projects 
were actively encouraged and funded by the British government. These investment policies 
expanded through the 1920s to include the Dominions in addition to the dependent Empire the 
policy originally engaged. Through the 1920s legislation also expanded to approve a wider array 
of projects in an effort to boost the British export market. Much like Empire settlement however, 
imperial investment was technically continued, but declined with the onset of the Depression as 
the British government faced financial shortages, and sought to encourage domestic investment 
to support the diversification of British industry.
91
 As economic recovery took place in the late 
1930s, colonial investment in its earlier manifestation excluding the self-governing Dominions 
was reintroduced and expanded thereafter.
92
  
The most significant area of Empire policy in terms of interwar economic cooperation 
was imperial preference. This policy was first reciprocated by Britain to the Dominions during 
the First World War and was incrementally expanded through the 1920s, particularly after the 
1923 Imperial Economic Conference. However, preferential tariffs for the Dominions were 
always limited and held in subordination to the promotion of international free trade. The British 
government attempted to balance the two systems throughout the 1920s without offending the 
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Dominions or foreign trading partners. The Depression definitively showed that free trade would 
not recover as was hoped in the 1920s, and so in 1932 Britain committed, albeit reluctantly, to a 
comprehensive system of imperial preference. This shift coincided with the British departure 
from free trade and the gold standard, and showed that to Britain, the Empire served as a backup 
to the cosmopolitan economy the government was seeking to rebuild, but was seen as better than 
total economic isolation.
93
 The Depression and the slowing of international trade to a near halt 
forced the British government to shift not only to a closed, tariff based system, but also to 
increasingly imperial markets, as free trade was no longer an option. This significant reversal of 
policy continued into the 1930s, but as with the other components of Britain’s imperial economic 
programme, it was gradually reversed as recovery began in the late 1930s, rendering it a 
temporary policy in reaction to the Depression. 
In considering the impact of the Depression in each of the main areas in Britain’s tri-
partite programme of economic policy during the interwar period, it is clear that the onset of the 
Depression significantly impacted the individual policies within each of the areas. That impact 
was typically manifested in one of three ways, either causing policies to be discarded, as with the 
abandonment of domestic land settlement, permanently changed such as the departure from gold-
standard currency, or temporarily postponed, such as imperial settlement and investment. In 
terms of imperial economics, the most prevalent impact of the Depression was postponement of 
policies for the duration of the crisis. For example, of the three main areas of imperial policy, 
settlement and investment were put on hold until the late 1930s, while imperial preference was 
initiated as an ostensibly permanent change, but was later reversed. This demonstrates that the 
shift from an open to protected economy in a longer-term view was not so much a change, as a 
                                                          
93
 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 73, 145., Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 81-82. 
36 
 
simple postponement of freer world trade. While all three areas were subordinate to the goals of 
reviving world trade in order to relieve unemployment in the United Kingdom, the Depression 
caused expansion and innovation in the domestic area, where nascent welfare policies were 
developed into systems. In the international sphere, old policies died hard and left traces long 
after they were removed, particularly the concept of international free trade. Most pertinent to 
this paper, imperial policy was half-heartedly maintained in the 1920s, and became the area of 
priority only when no other options were available, and subsequently lost prominence once 
alternative economic possibilities recovered in the late 1930s.  
2. Imperial Policy and Commonwealth Coordination  
The movement for a closer imperial unity encompassing political and economic matters 
had been present in imperial debates in Britain and the Dominions since the late nineteenth-
century. Although ideas of an imperial federation had fallen by the wayside by the early 1900s, 
groups such as the Round Table Movement were still active in advocating for closer imperial 
relations.
94
 While such groups were not cohesive and generally advocated for ideals that 
neglected the realities of a diverse Empire, they nonetheless influenced and inspired the imperial 
visionaries that played such a notable role in imperial politics through the period.
95
 Although in 
the early twentieth-century the campaign for closer imperial union had less impact in the more 
diverse area of imperial economics, it had encouraged some increased defence coordination 
leading up to the First World War.
96
 The exigencies of the War helped solidify this cooperation 
with the establishment of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. Thus, while the Dominions had no 
say in the initial years of the conflict, by 1917 they had a voice in high imperial policy, and 
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individual representation at the Paris Peace Conference by 1919. The 1917 War Cabinet fostered 
further cooperation among the emergent Commonwealth, leading to a wartime commitment to 
further Commonwealth constitutional development in the immediate postwar years.
97
   
The 1923 Imperial Economic Conference, however, was the first imperial conference to 
address economic considerations since the Imperial War Conference of 1917. While there had 
been a subsequent conference in 1921, it had focused primarily on the constitutional issues 
arising from the Dominions’ war records and had deferred economic issues until 1923. For 
example, in 1921 many of the delegates chose to discuss how the War had diffused power from 
London to the Dominions, and the Dominions had earned a new status within the imperial 
framework. Delegates from throughout the emergent Commonwealth stressed both the benefits 
of this new status, such as increased power to make their own economic treaties, as well as 
increased responsibilities such as an obligation to contribute to the costs of imperial defence, 
especially in regards to the upkeep of the Royal Navy.
98
 In this case commercial rhetoric 
remained limited, and emphasis was placed on the Dominions as peace-loving democracies, 
united by a spirit of imperial brotherhood.
99
 The consensus achieved regarding economic 
considerations at the 1917 Conference was that a system of imperial preference and economic 
coordination should be pursued with the goal of achieving an economically self-sufficient and 
thus secure Empire. This resolution was evidently a response to the circumstances of the First 
World War, and was accompanied by talks on the prohibition of trade with enemy countries, and 
how that trade could be further controlled.
100
 In light of the wartime limitations of foreign trade, 
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discussion of imperial preference was clearly an effort not only to secure supplies for the war-
economy, but also to support the export trade on which the United Kingdom relied. This would 
be achieved by shifting volume of trade away from an increasingly limited world market to 
imperial trading partners, which would not only ensure continued commerce for the duration of 
the war, but would also provide a more strategically secure network of trade after the war.
101
 The 
1917 Conference also implemented some infrastructure to this end, with discussion on imperial 
shipping, the role of the regulatory Board of Trade, and Empire settlement all as further 
measures to facilitate imperial commerce.
102
 True to these resolutions, imperial preference was 
implemented in the immediate postwar period, not comprehensively, but for a select schedule of 
goods.
103
 Within the context of these precursory measures, and following the rhetorically 
amiable, but less economically focused conference of 1921, the Imperial Economic Conference 
of 1923 convened in London.
104
  
The resolutions of the 1923 Conference are quite illuminating as to the goals of not only 
the British delegates facilitating the conference, but also the Dominion representatives. The 
unique position of India and the dependent status of the Colonial Empire rendered these parties 
relatively silent at the conference, their representatives supporting the resolutions in principle but 
not fully participating. In future, the representation of the Colonial Empire would be all but 
omitted and as previously noted, the differentiation of India rendered its representatives present, 
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but relatively uninvolved in the resolutions of economic-focused imperial conferences. At this 
point, the newest Dominion of Ireland and the economically minute Newfoundland also had little 
to contribute to the final resolutions.
105
The Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
South Africa, however made substantial contributions to the proceedings of the conference. As 
the 1923 Economic Conference was the first peace-time economic conference, it arguably set the 
standard for subsequent economic conferences in the interwar period. Consequently the active 
comportment of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, can be expected throughout 
the various conferences, as can the limited actions of Newfoundland and Ireland, and the 
altogether separate status of India and the Colonies. The activism of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and South Africa had roots in both the size and history of these Dominions. These were 
the largest and most economically developed Dominions leading up to the First World War, each 
of which furnished a significant contribution to the British war effort in both manpower and 
materiel. The confidence of economic growth and the pride of wartime accomplishments within 
the nationalistic context of the period rendered these Dominions particularly active at imperial 
conferences as they increasingly asserted their capacity for independence.
106
 
Ultimately, the 1923 Conference resolved to pursue an interlocking programme of 
increased imperial settlement, long term economic development and investment, increased 
coordination and trade, economic standardisation, the establishment of an advisory Imperial 
Economic Committee, and notably, the decision to uphold the preferential tariffs outlined at the 
1917 War Conference.
107
 These resolutions, while agreed to on the whole, bear the marks of 
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British policy objectives, as well as echoes of the various Dominions, as per the goals of each 
delegation outlined in their speeches at the opening of the conference.  
Speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom, the conference chairman Sir Philip Lloyd-
Greame detailed the variety of economic problems facing the Empire, but stressed that these had 
been mutually caused by the War. He emphasised the need for Britain to deal with its high 
unemployment through increased imperial trade, calling on the potential of imperial resources 
and markets to be tapped. He further called for those efforts to be coordinated in order to get 
settlers and capital moving to develop the Empire, thus creating markets for British 
manufacturing, and reciprocally, increasing the British market for Empire goods. This vision of 
imperial economics was a neat, self-sustaining, and mutually beneficial model of development 
that incorporated both imperial cooperation and protective tariffs to shelter that cooperation from 
both internal and external competition. This position is reflective of Lloyd-Greame’s 
membership in the Conservative party, which was in office at the time. As will be seen through 
the course of this paper, of the major political parties in Britain, the Conservatives would 
advocate most strongly for a system of protective tariffs implemented in conjunction with a more 
comprehensive system of imperial trade.   
William Lyon Mackenzie-King, speaking for the Canadian delegation, somewhat 
tempered the preceding speech with the British vision of development, by stating that there were 
limits to Dominion markets and their capacity to absorb settlers, as well as limits to government 
intervention in economic growth. However, he echoed that governments could coordinate and 
remove obstacles to trade, and as his British counterpart, he concluded that economic 
coordination and goodwill would benefit the whole Empire. 
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William Massey from New Zealand stressed that while Britain had shifted to an imperial 
basis for imports during the War, the Dominions had shifted their imports abroad, as British 
manufacturing had turned from exports to war materiel. Massey proposed that if imports were to 
be shifted back to Britain from alternative wartime suppliers, full reciprocal preference must be 
extended to the Dominions from the United Kingdom, as opposed to the nominal reciprocal 
preferences established at the 1917 War Conference. He concluded that a programme of more 
imperial settlement, coordination, and preferential tariffs was the key to the Empire’s economic 
success. Jan Christiaan or “General” Smuts of South Africa echoed this sentiment, citing the 
untapped resource potential of Africa as a waiting boon to Empire trade, simply requiring further 
white settlement, investment and buyers in other parts of the Empire to unlock its potential.  
By far the wordiest of the Dominion representatives was Stanley Bruce of Australia, who 
outlined the importance of imperial markets and preferential tariffs, as well as outlining a 
number of proposals which would be discussed in turn by the various conference committees.
108
 
It is perhaps fitting that Bruce spoke at such length, as his Australian domestic platform of “men, 
money and markets,” precisely describes the goals stated by the delegates as well as the 
resolutions of the 1923 Conference. Imperial settlement would provide the men, imperial 
development and investment would provide the money, and a system of imperial preference 
would provide protected and guaranteed markets. These three main elements formed an 
interlocking programme of economic recovery, with each part depending on the implementation 
of the others, at least in theory. As with the 1917 War Conference, supplementary measures were 
designed to facilitate this programme of recovery. For example, the Dominions were given 
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access to British Trade Commissioners in order to facilitate information sharing.
109
 Similarly, 
Britain also advocated for steps to link Dominion currencies to sterling in order to stabilise 
international finance until such time as the gold-standard could be reintroduced.
110
 While both of 
these measures were novel, they did not form the bulk of the discussion, but rather supplemented 
the previously mentioned programme of men, money and markets. Throughout the conference, 
there was a strong emphasis on coordination and cooperation for economic improvement. 
Although a comprehensive system of imperial preference was not implemented, some limited 
preferences were considered, as well as efforts to encourage Britons to “buy Empire.” 111 The 
Imperial Economic Committee concluded that to this end, the conference was a success, having 
made significant gains in designing a programme of imperial economic development, all the 
while maintaining a “good spirit of business-like cooperation.”112  
Turning to the 1932 Ottawa Conference nearly ten years later, the picture that emerges is 
quite different. The results of this economic conference were also generally accepted as a 
success, however, it is often characterised as a much more tenuous success than the conference 
of 1923; one historian even going so far as to say that had the weather been any hotter in Ottawa 
that summer, it is doubtful anything constructive would have been accomplished.
113
 In the 1920s, 
the impact of the War was affecting Britain much more seriously than the Dominions. The onset 
of the Depression in 1929 greatly changed the economic outlook of the emergent 
Commonwealth, precipitating crises in each of the most economically active Dominions, namely 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Therefore, the context of the 1932 Ottawa 
                                                          
109
 Imperial Economic Conference...1923, 257-258. 
110
 Ibid., 458. 
111 The Empire Marketing Board was established in 1926 for this purpose, and worked to encourage increased 
imperial trade in lieu of a comprehensive system of imperial preference. 
112
 Ibid., 581. 
113
 Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 220. 
43 
 
Conference was not only high unemployment and reduced trade in Britain, but also in the 
Dominions. Australia faced problems of credit imbalances and crippling debt which spilled over 
into New Zealand later into the 1930s.
114
 Canada, which held financial reserves in New York 
rather than London, suffered heavily from losses with its greatest trading and financial partner, 
the United States. South Africa’s largely mining based economy felt the effects of the 
abandonment of the gold standard in 1931, and associated problems of a suffering financial 
system centred in London.
115
  
Within this context, the delegations at the Ottawa Conference eschewed Empire 
settlement and development to focus on a comprehensive and reciprocal system of imperial 
preference as the main subject of negotiations. While some preference had existed previously, 
most of these tariff concessions were extended by the Dominions to the United Kingdom, and 
were largely unreciprocated except for a select schedule of goods outlined at the 1917 
Conference, and implemented in the Finance Act of 1919.
116
 In the wake of the Ottawa 
Conference, Britain would make good on negotiations by extending comprehensive preference to 
Dominion goods, as well as exempting Dominion products from the general tariff which had 
been recently implemented with the Import Duties Act of 1932.
117
 Britain would also approve 
prohibitions of trade with Russia, as per Dominion requests to ban cheaper Russian imports 
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which undermined Dominion exports to the British domestic market.
118
 Recurring themes of 
commercial coordination, standardisation, and cooperation were prevalent, yet the spirit in which 
those issues were discussed, and in which the preferential agreements were reached was quite 
different from the “business-like cooperation” of 1923.119  By all accounts the negotiations were 
difficult; one British delegate even wrote to his superiors during the conference complaining of 
Canada and Australia “brutally” dictating their terms of negotiation.120 Ultimately, the 
appearance of the word “negotiation” underscores the different atmosphere to the conferences: 
whereas 1923 was based on cooperation, 1932 was based on bargaining.  
The changed tone between the 1923 and 1932 conferences was perceived by 
contemporaries, particularly after the beginning of the Depression. As the crisis deepened the 
coalition cabinet of the new national government in Britain had concluded that the Dominions 
were “not in a negotiating mood,” and consequently the British delegates should be well 
equipped for the conference.
121
 Cabinet elaborated that failure of the Ottawa Conference to do 
something to improve trade would be fatal to imperial interests, and as such the British 
delegation sailed with powers to negotiate, an arsenal of potential concessions, and instructions 
to not let any agreements fail, even if it meant re-opening seemingly dead-end negotiations.
122
 
Among these concessions, some had been designed for the express purpose of providing 
something for British delegates to concede at Ottawa. The Import Duties Act of 1932, for 
example, which ended the longstanding British commitment to free trade with the 
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implementation of a general tariff, included provisions to not apply those tariffs to the 
Dominions until after the Ottawa Conference later that year, effectively leaving the general tariff 
hanging over the Dominions pending the results of negotiations at Ottawa.
123
  Further 
demonstrating the changed British position leading up to the Ottawa Conference was a 1931 
report by the Economic Advisory Council’s Committee of Economists. This body had been 
formed in February of 1930 as part of the second Labour government’s machinery to resolve 
unemployment. The Council had its roots in postwar reconstruction and addressed the need for a 
permanent expert body to advise cabinet on economic matters.
124
 When considering the shift to 
an imperial based economy, the Committee of Economists informed cabinet that while free trade 
was desirable and indeed preferable, economic solidarity with the Empire based on a system of 
imperial preference was better than no trade at all. Consequently, the British position at the 
upcoming Ottawa Conference would depend on the state of world trade at the time. Should trade 
begin to improve, there would be less need to cooperate with the Dominions, but if trade did not 
improve, the British delegation should be ready to offer concessions and forge some agreement 
towards the improvement of Empire trade.
125
 
The significant difference in the mood of the 1923 and 1932 conferences suggests a 
changed status quo of intra-imperial relations over the course of this period. There had been 
significant constitutional developments during the near decade between the conferences, but 
while constitutional developments may have equipped the Dominions to be more negotiation 
minded, the overall shift from cooperation to bargaining is a change which was a direct result of 
the Depression.  
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Chronological Interwar Policy Analysis 
Bearing in mind the various interpretations found in the historiography, whether stressing 
ideologies and politics, imperial structures, or long-term macro trends, as well as the differences 
between the imperial conferences of 1923 and 1932, this paper will now review British economic 
policy through the interwar period. In order to establish a baseline for comparison with the 
British approach to economics and Empire during the Depression, as well as to situate 
Depression-era policies within the context of existing British policies and economic troubles, the 
first section of this analysis will focus on policies from the end of the First World War up to the 
Wall Street Crash of 1929. The narrative of how British policies began to change with the 
Depression, and prefaced the shift to imperial economics that occurred at the Ottawa Conference 
will be the basis of the second part of this section. The third part of this analysis will explore the 
preparation, debates, and results of the Ottawa Conference and the final section will review the 
outcomes of the Ottawa Conference and trace its effects into the late 1930s. 
While tracing the British economic policies of the period, this paper will also incorporate 
international, and more pertinently, imperial conferences to demonstrate how British policies 
were applied externally, and how the Dominions reacted to and engaged with those policies. As 
discussed in the previous section of this paper,  British economic policy during the interwar 
period was generally designed as an interlocking tri-partite programme for domestic, 
international, and imperial economic recovery. Each of these economic areas was further defined 
by policies not necessarily exclusive to each area, but nonetheless tailored to their individual 
circumstances. Domestically, immediate unemployment relief was pursued with policies for 
public works projects, agricultural land development, unemployment insurance, and long-term 
industrial re-organisation. International policies focused on re-establishing gold standard 
47 
 
currency after its abandonment during the War, and freeing up world trade by reducing, if not 
abolishing tariffs and trade restrictions. Economic policy toward the Empire was best summed up 
by Stanley Bruce’s slogan of “men, money and markets,” or a programme of imperial settlement, 
imperial development and investment, and preferential tariffs. While analysis of the individual 
policies themselves requires that the overall programme be dissected into its component parts, 
the periodic focus on international and imperial conferences will help resituate analysis to recall 
the entire programme within the narrative of the wider period. 
1. 1919-1929 
The economic narrative of interwar Britain began with a short-lived economic boom 
immediately following the First World War. After this brief upswing, Britain sank into an 
economic slump which resulted in a consistently high rate of unemployment that would 
henceforth be the backdrop to British interwar economic policy. The spectre of domestic 
unemployment informed most British policies in the interwar period whether domestically, 
imperially, or internationally oriented. Some historians have argued that during this period, with 
the threat of war gone, the United Kingdom became inherently isolationist and self-absorbed.
126
 
A more holistic approach recognises that this apparent self-absorption was really a function of 
domestic political pressure, which shaped not only British policy, but also imperial and 
international policy.
127
 In a sense, the links between the imperial model of governance and the 
British parliamentary system gave the British electorate an exceptional weight in world affairs as 
politicians tried to juggle the interests of world trade, or the British Empire, with politics at 
home. While unemployment was not a new issue in the 1920s, it had grown to a new scale, 
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which put a great deal of pressure on British politicians to do something about the 
unemployment situation at home.
128
 To this end, the objectives of British economic policy in the 
interwar period were on all levels subordinate to remedying domestic unemployment. 
Commentators at the time were well aware that through its industrialisation Britain’s economy 
had grown along colonial lines. The result was a British metropolitan economy that aside from 
coal and wool exported mostly manufactured goods; hence the Victorian era characterisation of 
Britain as the workshop of the world. This industrial economy relied heavily on exports, the 
market for which had been severely disrupted by the First World War.
129
 Consequently, the goal 
of reinvigorating international trade became the assumed role of Britain not only internationally 
in  Britain's capacity as one of the world’s leading economic powers, but also domestically, as 
increased trade and exports was the most obvious solution for British unemployment. Thus, 
restarting international trade and resolving domestic unemployment became the all 
encompassing goals for British policy-makers after the War.  
As the postwar boom deteriorated into economic malaise, domestic legislation began to 
shift from policies designed to restore a pre-war civilian economy, to legislation under the 
umbrella of these overriding interwar goals. For example, in 1919 the Restoration of Pre-War 
Practices Act and the Industrial Courts Act provided the legal channels for industry owners to 
recover factories and assets nationalised for the war effort, and a court system to settle any 
disputes arising from the process.
130
 Such acts focused on converting industry back to pre-war 
standards. In the same year, legislation relating to unemployment and public works made no 
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mention of extenuating circumstances, and were only modified that year in a maintenance 
capacity, with funding adjusted according to inflation.
131
 The declining British economy and 
accompanying rise  in unemployment was reflected in those acts over the following two years, 
which saw not only an adjustment to the previous Unemployment Act, but also several iterations 
of the Unemployment Insurance Act, and the further expansion of unemployment-related 
legislation to extend benefits to an increasingly affected population. These new and adjusted acts 
expanded funding for unemployment insurance not only in response to inflation, but also to meet 
increased demand,  and included increases to available benefits as well as wider eligibility for 
workers, women, youth, and dependants.
132
 Acts to provide loans for public works projects were 
equally prevalent in early 1920s legislation, and also shifted from a maintenance footing during 
the initial years of postwar upswing, to increased emphasis on unemployment relief.
133
 The 
changing substance and frequency of such legislation is particularly illustrative of the gravity of 
the unemployment problem in 1920s Britain, and underscores why responding to unemployment 
became such an all-consuming mandate for governments across party lines. 
Britain’s accompanying international policy commitment to restoring gold-standard 
based free trade was particularly evident in its dealings with the League of Nations. While an 
analysis of the regular sessions of the League of Nations is beyond the scope of this project, the 
1922 International Economic Conference, organised by the League, is a good access point to 
viewing British international economic policy in practice.
134
 This particular conference was 
convened to address the economic reconstruction of Europe in the wake of the First World War. 
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While delegations from the British Dominions were present at the conference, and represented a 
sizable contingent of the members of various committees, their voices are all but absent from the 
conference record, ostensibly being in accord with the British delegation and therefore not 
independently voicing their national positions, except during private meetings of the British 
Empire delegation itself.
135
 This silence of the Dominions in the conference records makes it all 
the more probable that we can detect the British economic aims in the resolutions of the 
conference through the added preponderance of Dominion support for British propositions, in 
addition to the stated unanimity of the conference commission reports.
136
 This silence is also an 
interesting attestation to the subordination of imperial concerns to world economic 
reconstruction, as many of the conference resolutions would be at odds with establishing an 
imperial trading bloc. For example the conference’s Committee on Economics unanimously 
called for a return to pre-war trading patterns, with progress towards free trade and as few tariffs 
as possible.
137
 The conference’s Committee of Finance supplemented this call for a return to the 
pre-war status quo by calling for stable currency based on an international gold standard as the 
first step to economic reconstruction.
138
 A recurring theme in the discussions and conclusions of 
the conference was British support for stable gold-based currency and freer international trade.
139
   
Writing in 1919, British economist Herbert Foxwell aptly summed up the general 
direction of British international economic policy in the immediate post-war years. Foxwell 
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noted that the age of laissez-faire capitalism was coming to an end, and that governments needed 
to take on a more active economic role.
140
 However, he stated further that there were limitations 
to government economic involvement, especially at an imperial level, going so far as to call 
state-run economic blocs dangerous, as they facilitated the creation of monopolies and fostered 
the predatory competition that helped cause the First World War.
141
 Yet Foxwell also recognised 
the benefits of defence and financial security associated with an imperial bloc, and thus argued 
for an imperial financial bloc to provide a stable currency on which to base free and fair 
competition in global trade, in a sense advocating for a post-war re-evaluation of Victorian 
gentlemanly capitalism.
142
 This system would incorporate the Empire as a component of a wider 
world economic system, allowing the benefits of its security to be enjoyed, without allowing it to 
become too powerful. Much like Foxwell’s recommendations, although limited imperial 
preference was initiated in 1919 as per wartime agreements, and the subject remained at the 
forefront of imperial relations, efforts to restart international free trade became, and remained a 
much more significant preoccupation for British policy makers in the 1920s. 
The British preoccupation with international free trade is not to say that limited imperial 
economic developments were altogether undesirable. Although an imperial economic bloc could 
be dangerous as outlined by Foxwell, there were nonetheless security benefits associated with 
The Empire, as well as its potential use to facilitate the recovery of world trade; again 
subordinating the Empire to the overarching goal of resolving British unemployment. Thus, 
while a programme of imperial trade might be sacrificed in favour of international free trade, an 
imperial financial bloc could maintain some of the economic cooperation fostered during the 
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War, as well as further promote international trade. In this way, with some concession on the part 
of imperial trade, policies of imperial and international economics could be reconciled within the 
overarching goals of British economic policy.    
The subordination of imperial economics in the 1920s is all the more evident when 
considering policies directly related to the Empire. Imperial economic policy in the 1920s was 
largely built on precedents established during the First World War.
143
 Imperial preference, the 
practice of extending preferential tariff rates to Empire countries, whether between the various 
Dominions and colonies, or more frequently, between these and the United Kingdom, was not a 
new idea, having been discussed in various iterations since the Colonial Conference of 1897. 
However, while some preferential tariffs did exist within the Empire, most of these were 
extended by the Dominions to the United Kingdom, and it was not until the First World War that 
imperial preference was implemented in reciprocity from the United Kingdom to the 
Dominions.
144
  The Imperial War Conference of 1917 saw the initiation of a limited system of 
imperial preference with some new preferential rates extended from the United Kingdom to the 
Dominions. These preliminary preferences were designed to be implemented in conjunction with 
a programme of Empire settlement in order to increase the amount of prospective consumers 
benefitting from the preferential trade rates.
145
 This initial programme of increased trade and 
settlement was born out of the War as a prospective solution to unemployment as soldiers were 
demobilised, and was intended to deepen existing channels of imperial exchange, rather than 
create new ones. British policy makers recognised these potential commercial benefits, and 
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calculated further advantages of not only increased trade, but also closer cooperation, and a 
better sense of security brought about by a more homogenously British Empire.
146
 From its 
wartime idealistic origins, the financial encouragement of Empire settlement would soon go 
beyond support for emigrating veterans to a wider imperial vision that could be applied to any 
interested British citizens.
147
 By 1920 funding had been approved for the British Empire 
Exhibition in order to promote Empire trade and settlement, and in 1922 The Empire Settlement 
Act formalised the program of assisted emigration in coordination with Dominion, as well as 
colony and protectorate governments.
148
 While investment for imperial development was not a 
feature of these initial war-time ideas of coordinated settlement and trade, it is easy to see how 
imperial investment and development would supplement such a programme. Some imperial 
visionaries saw these ideas as the opportunity to establish an economic union of the Empire or at 
least an imperial trading bloc in preparation for some future political union.
149
 However, the 
reality was that free trade had grown so important to the export-oriented British economic system 
that economic union of the Empire would prove too unwieldy in a long-term sense, let alone for 
the quick reconstruction needed to combat rising unemployment in the immediate postwar 
years.
150
  Consequently, British economic policy in the 1920s would focus less on the wartime 
goal of establishing an imperial trading bloc than it would on restarting world trade more 
generally.  
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In terms of imperial development policy, largely based on investment, the general 
preoccupation with world, rather than imperial economics is also reflected in the years following 
the First World War. For example, the Overseas Trade Act of 1920 guaranteed loans to non-
imperial countries for the express purpose of boosting international trade.
151
 While this act 
originally excluded the Empire, the next year it was retroactively modified to include the 
Dominions and colonies, suggesting that Empire trade may have been an important consideration 
to British policy makers, but their first consideration was resumption of pre-war international 
trading patterns.
152
 The extension of the Overseas Trade Act, as well as the Trade Facilities Act 
to colonial development projects was largely unsuccessful in terms of the development it sought 
to encourage, and it was not until the 1929 Colonial Development Act that a programme of loans 
was legislated to expedite development exclusively in the British colonies.
153
 Both international 
efforts to boost trade, as well as later legislation on colonial development were couched in terms 
of their impact on relieving British unemployment. This was largely due to the growth such trade 
would encourage in the British export economy.
154
 It was only when international trade failed to 
rebound, thereby leaving the domestic problem of unemployment unresolved, as well as 
complicating British access to resources from abroad, that colonial development was pursued 
more earnestly. Political pressure at home demanded something be done about the ongoing 
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economic downturn, again demonstrating that imperial concerns were secondary to world 
economics and tertiary to British unemployment.
155
  
To return to the initial example of the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923 in light of 
the direction of British economic policy in the early post-war years, the ostensive cooperation 
and resolve to increase Empire trade seems remarkable considering the British preoccupation 
with world, rather than imperial economics. However, in the discussion records of the 
conference, it is plain that Dominion delegates were aware of Britain’s domestic economic 
situation, and given that Britain was in crisis the British government would take any measures 
necessary to get out, even if those measures were not immediately beneficial to the Empire.
156
 
Dominion delegates further recognised that the Dominions needed British markets, and as such, 
while still prioritising a programme of wider world trade Britain could still offer something for 
Dominion cooperation with the promise of secure imperial self sufficiency, in addition to the 
1917 system of limited preferential tariffs that would ensure some access to British markets.
157
 
Consequently, Dominion leaders were prepared to accept a limited programme of imperial 
economics in order to allow Britain to pursue the most expedient path to economic recovery, all 
the while preparing to help overcome free-trade hold-outs in the British government that were 
preventing a more comprehensive imperial economic programme from being developed in the 
long-term.
158
  It was argued that economic crisis required imperial cooperation and furthermore, 
as the crisis was affecting the mother country but not the Dominions, it was consequently the 
duty of the Dominions to assist the United Kingdom as much as possible for the sake of their 
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own economic positions and shared British sentiment.
159
 Using this rhetoric throughout the 
conference, delegates expressed their desire to maintain cooperation rather than bargaining, yet 
when discussing potential increases to imperial preference, it was resolved that should any 
additional preferences be enacted, they would be bilaterally negotiated between the United 
Kingdom and individual Dominion governments on a case-by-case basis.
160
 Ian Drummond has 
argued that such a system of bilateral negotiations was inherently divisive, and indeed, by 
relegating such negotiations to bilateral talks it could be argued that the conference maintained a 
spirit of cooperation rather than bargaining by simply not bargaining at the conference.
161
 
However, the relative success of the conference and continuing economic coordination in the 
following years suggests that for the time being, even when such bargaining took place, the 
conditions and polices of the time prevented negotiations from being as “brutal” as they would 
seem at the Ottawa Conference. 
If there was division among the self-governing parts of the Empire in the 1920s, it was 
not strongly manifested in the economic sphere. British economic policy remained remarkably 
consistent, with a programme aimed at combating unemployment at home and expanding Empire 
trade as a subsidiary of expanded world trade abroad. Should there be a conflict between Empire 
and world trade, policy makers attempted to strike a balance between the two, but would 
ultimately defer to the latter in case of conflict, or attempt to ignore the problem. For example, in 
the wake of the 1923 Economic Conference the British cabinet debated the merits of extending 
further preferences to the Dominions, in this case for fruit and sugar, and whether further 
preference would cause tax losses for colonial producers, or would expand markets in the 
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Dominions. The question of protecting British and colonial producers, or allowing intra-imperial 
competition was also heavily discussed. Ultimately, when these complications arose the cabinet 
agreed to do nothing, calling for a maintained status quo which liberally interpreted the 
agreements of the 1923 Conference and limited financial commitment to the Empire.
162
 Over the 
next several years, this dichotomous policy continued, with British policy simultaneously 
moving, at least rhetorically, toward increased Empire trade as well as increased international 
free trade. Legislation slowly implemented some extensions to imperial preference, but remained 
non-committal. It was not until 1924 that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was approved to 
proceed with the preferential recommendations of the 1923 Conference, and it was not until 1925 
that the preferential tariffs were finally implemented.
163
 Yet the same year also saw an increase 
in certain industrial tariffs, which were recognised as counter to the spirit of imperial preference, 
yet implemented for the sake of protecting British industry, accompanied with the clarification 
that the tariffs were for specific industries only, and were not meant to challenge the system of 
imperial preference.
164
 Similarly, while the Dominions were included as eligible recipients of the 
increased funding available for trade development loans in the mid 1920s, such loans had been 
available to foreign countries since 1920 and to the dependent colonial Empire since 1921.
165
 It 
is worth noting that the tardiness of implementing even these limited imperial preferences could 
be the result not only of a generally non-committal Britain, but also the result of British party 
politics at the time. After the fall of the war-era coalition government, a shaky Conservative 
government took office in October of 1922, only to be replaced by Labour in January of 1924, 
before the Conservatives rallied to win a large majority that October. The governmental changes 
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of 1924 could explain the delay in approving and implementing the preferences recommended in 
1923. More forcefully suggesting the role of party politics in these delays is the simultaneous 
implementation of the limited protective tariffs in 1925. With a majority Conservative 
government in favour of protective tariffs, this is a logical outcome in the wake of the 1924 
election. 
Into the mid 1920s, British domestic policy retained its focus on public works and 
unemployment countermeasures, with cabinet discussion in each government styling the policies 
of Empire settlement and investment as a remedy for unemployment to be coordinated by the 
unemployment office, rather than the foundations of a secure financial or strategic bloc under the 
supervision of the Treasury or Colonial Office.
166
 Funding for unemployment insurance was 
increased as well as expanded to conditionally include more of the unemployment population on 
a temporary basis.
167
 Public works funding was somewhat reduced leading up to 1925, reflecting 
the cabinet’s conclusion that relief through public works projects could only be a temporary 
measure while waiting a more full recovery of the export market.
168
 There was no doubt 
optimism that restoration of the gold standard n 1925 would boost British industrial recovery and 
thus, funding cuts to public works and relief work programmes in 1924 and 1925 would not be 
detrimental to the unemployment situation.  
The restoration of the gold standard in 1925 was a significant step toward a renewed pre-
war model of free international trade, which had repercussions not only in foreign branches of 
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British economic policy, but also in its domestic and imperial branches.
169
 The gold standard had 
been one of the hallmarks of British financial superiority in the pre-war era, and promised to 
boost the flagging economy and give Britain the economic power required to get world trade 
moving again. Even under a protection-inclined Conservative government, restored financial 
power was an outcome which could be applied to both open and closed economies, and would 
arguably help resolve the politically important issue of unemployment. This financial restoration 
demonstrated that in spite of party interpretations or opposition of some economic analysts, 
notably Keynes, a sizable part of the government continued to adhere to the pre-war economic 
orthodoxy of gold standard currency and open markets as the proper and natural state of 
capitalism.
170
 As Stephen Constantine has argued, in the 1920s this economic orthodoxy won out 
against the proposed imperial economy, rendering the Empire an attractive and visionary 
solution to British and world economic woes, but one which had little actual effect on policy.
171
  
Throughout the 1920s there was a gap between the rhetoric of imperial economics, and 
the reality of actual policy.
172
 However, in spite of the subordination of the imperial economy, 
economic issues did not seem to have an adverse effect on imperial economic relations at this 
point. Cabinet had maintained the position that boosting imperial trade would be beneficial for 
all parties, even if to a lesser degree than world trade.
173
 As in 1923, the Dominions agreed that 
even if a full imperial economic system could not be developed while Britain was in recovery, 
increased imperial trade should nonetheless be pursued as much as possible. At the next imperial 
conference in 1926, it was unanimously agreed that the work begun in 1923 for increased trade 
                                                          
169
 Gold Standard Act 1925. 
170
 Darwin, The Empire Project , 372., Keynes opposed the restoration of the gold standard, arguing in his 1923 
work, A Tract on Monetary Reform, that it’s inflationary effects would reduce wages and increase unemployment, 
thereby undermining economic confidence. Cited in: Constantine, Unemployment in Britain Between the Wars, 56.  
171
Constantine, Unemployment in Britain Between the Wars, 55.  
172
 Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 42. 
173
 TNA: CAB 23/50, CP 44(25), Conclusions, 7 August 1925. 
60 
 
and economic cooperation was going well and that increased trade should be the continued goal 
of imperial economic coordination.
174
 As such, it was concluded that a separate conference 
dedicated to economics as in 1923 would not be necessary after the 1926 Conference.
175
  
This level of commitment to economic cooperation, in spite of British subordination of 
the imperial economy is likely the result of two main factors. First is that since the exponential 
growth of the Empire in the late 19
th
 century, intra-imperial trade had already been growing 
within the pre-war context.
176
 Consequently, although with fewer benefits for the Dominions due 
to wholly unreciprocated preferential tariffs, imperial economies had nonetheless been 
converging even within the free-trade based pre-war economy.
177
 This convergence was largely 
due to the nature of the pre-war colonial system. As Foxwell noted “trade follows the flag.”178 
Capie elaborates this statement by arguing that capital flows, trade and financial balances, tariff 
preferences, and a common British sentiment all contributed to a converging imperial economy, 
which would be further brought together by the demands of the First World War.
179
 In the pre-
war colonial economic model, the colonies provided primary resources to the metropole, 
rendering prewar economic convergence logical, even in the case of the self-governing 
Dominions. As the British manufacturing and export economy grew, so too did the 
predominantly resource-based economies of the Dominions, rendering imperial economic 
interests complementary. However, this colonial model could only function if colonial 
economies were subordinate to the metropole.
180
 The growth of Dominion manufacturing 
economies, particularly during the First World War, led to potential competition with British 
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manufacturers as the Dominion sought to nurture these industries in the postwar years. 
Furthermore, British assumptions about the complementary nature of imperial economics, and 
the subordination of Dominion economies later caused considerable friction during the 
Depression. However, in the 1920s the trend of pre-war economic convergence, coupled with the 
wartime height of imperial sentiment arguably contributed to continued imperial economic 
cooperation. Even if the ideas of a more secure, self-sustaining, and mutually beneficial imperial 
economy were unattainable in the 1920s, a return to the pre-war status quo would still provide 
some growth in imperial trade, which while far short of the wartime ideals, was better than no 
growth whatsoever, and was therefore a British policy direction which the Dominions could 
support for the time being.
181
  
A second factor contributing to the lack of economic discord was, in this case the 
concentration of disagreement in the political and constitutional arenas. Without committing this 
paper to a full political review of the interwar period for reasons of scope, the distinction 
between economic and politico-legal spheres warrants a short case study to illustrate the 
dichotomous effects of imperial economic and political policies. To this end, the Chanak Crisis 
of 1922 is a useful example of the interplay between economic and political factors. This war-
scare between Turkey and Britain, during which Canada and South Africa had refused to support 
a British consideration of war, opened questions of imperial unity and constitutional authority for 
such declarations. While the 1923 Imperial Conference had already been dedicated to discussing 
economic concerns, the repercussions of the Chanak Crisis were still evident when imperial 
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delegates next convened in 1926.
182
 This conference had an extensive focus on constitutional and 
legal concerns, with the report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee prominent and lengthy 
among the conference papers. This report recognised the unique political and cultural 
circumstances of the various parts of the Empire, and concluded that it would be impossible to 
create a constitution for the whole Empire. Therefore, the unity of the Empire was based not on 
the presence of a constitution, but on mutual loyalty to the crown, and a foundation of shared 
positive ideals rather than negotiations.
183
 The report concluded with a definition of freely-
associated, legally-equal, self-governing states which would later be reaffirmed as the Balfour 
Declaration which unofficially laid the foundations of the Commonwealth.
184
  
While the Chanak Crisis arguably unleashed this chain of legally divisive intra-imperial 
political developments,
 
imperial economic cooperation remained remarkably consistent.
 185
 In 
spite of the political division over the 1922 Chanak crisis, the economic conference of 1923 was 
largely successful, and the conference of 1926 saw no reason to modify the resolutions of 1923 
save to verify and encourage them.
186
 Furthermore, at the World Economic Conference in 1927, 
much like at the 1922 Genoa Conference, the British programme of economic recovery is echoed 
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in the conference report, which called for the removal of tariffs and a return to free trade.
187
 Also 
reminiscent of British policy was reference to the main obstacles to economic recovery being the 
reduced flows of labour, capital and goods, much like the men, money and markets of imperial 
terminology.
188
 Some imperial bloc-voting on these resolutions was possible as had been in the 
case with the ever-present, but ever-silent imperial delegates of 1922. However, at the 1926 
Imperial Conference the previous year, with all its rhetoric of Dominion equality and free 
association, it had been stated that the Dominions had the right to individual representation at 
international conferences, and many were present the following year at the World Economic 
Conference.
189
 Thus, by 1927 the Dominions were much less obliged by tradition to follow the 
British lead as in 1922, yet the strong association of British economic rhetoric and the final 
report of the World Economic Conference suggest that the British programme did receive strong 
support at the conference.
190
 
From the end of the First World War to the eve of the Depression, the Dominions’ desire 
to help the mother country, a ‘better than nothing’ British attitude toward imperial trade, the 
confinement of discord to the constitutional arena, and the British approach of juggling imperial, 
international and domestic policies were all at play in imperial economic policy and 
coordination. These factors were brought to bear on policy aimed at the twin goals of 
resurrecting pre-war style world free trade and relieving domestic unemployment in Britain.  
These factors influenced British, and by extension imperial economics in the 1920s, but had little 
impact on imperial economic relations. British economic policy in the late 1920s upheld the 
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status quo of previous years, without significant changes to key pieces of legislation. For 
example, in the domestic sphere, the Unemployment Insurance Act and Public Works Loans Act 
were adjusted for inflation and consolidated in 1928 and 1929, but no significant changes were 
made to their substance.
191
 Similarly, in regards to investment, the Overseas Trade Act and the 
Development Act of 1929 provided loans for international and domestic development 
respectively, and the Colonial Development Act established a similar programme of 
development-oriented investment in the colonial Empire.
192
 All of these efforts sought to jump-
start global trade, as per the goals of British economic policy since the end of the First World 
War, and as reaffirmed at the 1929 World Economic Conference.
193
 As this programme was 
pursued in the 1920s, while there was some political division within the self-governing Empire, 
their economic coordination continued to receive support in spite of the half-hearted commitment 
of the British government. Even as the Depression began in the United States in late 1929, until 
the end of that year the British government remained committed to supporting the British 
commitment to free trade, while simultaneously increasing imperial economic coordination and 
rhetorically committing to building up an imperial economy. This dichotomous system had seen 
some imperial economic growth in the past, but did not account for reciprocal preferential 
benefits to the Dominions, and was not conducive to creating a self-sufficient Empire, nor an 
effective imperial economic bloc, as per the wartime ideas of the direction of imperial economic 
cooperation.
194
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2. Depression  
British economic policy, with its tri-partite programme of international, imperial and 
domestic goals centred on fostering world trade to relieve domestic unemployment, would be 
significantly altered with the arrival of the Great Depression; changing the nature of that 
programme as well as the nature of imperial economic cooperation. As the global economy felt 
the domino effect of economic collapse in the United States, and later continental Europe, the 
need to take measures beyond the standard policies of the 1920s became increasingly serious as 
it was realised that domestic pressures were now, more than ever, overcoming international 
sentiment encouraging free-trade.
195
 Some historians employing a long-term view have 
characterised the Depression as a slump, or worsening of the economic downturn already being 
experienced in Britain, rather than a new crisis in its own right.
196
 This interpretation is true in 
regards to the British domestic economy which had been in crisis for most of the 1920s. 
However, as the crisis escalated, it did have strong effects in Britain. Cabinet discussions from 
the time demonstrate that while the Depression had a delayed impact between its origins in 
America and its repercussions in Europe, it was nonetheless a fresh crisis.
197
 Considering the 
impact of the Depression on the Empire more widely, it was indeed a new crisis, not only in 
regards to Britain’s capacity to meet the economic demands of the Empire, but also in regard to 
the operation of the Empire as a whole.
 198
 Whether out of loyalty to the mother country or the 
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promise of future benefits once Britain recovered, in the 1920s Britain’s policies were still 
supported by the Dominions. This support was in spite of the dichotomous nature of imperial 
policy which remained an idealistic and ever-present part of Britain’s economic programme, yet 
was continually subordinated to policies working towards world free trade, which was often at 
odds with a self-supporting imperial economy and provided no reciprocal advantages for the 
Dominions. The dispersal of this spirit of cooperation by the time of the Ottawa Conference in 
1932 was a direct result of the Depression and its Empire-wide impact. 
The impact of the new crisis was delayed by some six months, during which the initial 
reaction of the newly elected Labour government in 1929 was to maintain and expand the 
policies of the previous decade without altering the composition of the governing tri-partite 
programme. Given the Labour government’s commitment to working class welfare, the 
continuation and expansion of welfare programmes and continued attempts to restore 
international trade are not surprising. As the economic situation deteriorated into 1930, 
domestically the Unemployment Insurance and Public Works Loans Acts saw spending limits 
raised several times in response to increased unemployment.
199
 Local authorities were given 
increased power to carry out public works projects for unemployment relief, and income tax was 
not raised that year.
200
 While these measures were expanded as a temporary solution to mounting 
unemployment, behind closed doors cabinet concluded that brash short-term spending would 
only be more costly in the end, and that long term reconstructive plans were needed, including 
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the nationalisation of industries, even if such measures potentially caused more unemployment in 
the interim.
201
  
In terms of international policy, the Overseas Trade Act was extended from its 1929 
iteration to provide longer term further funding for foreign investments.
202
Apart from this 
extension, most international policies remained in place without modification for the time being. 
Yet all of these measures, both domestic and international were conventional ones. A prime 
example of the government’s adherence to these older solutions is a scathing review by the 
Labour cabinet of a Liberal publication on how to solve the unemployment crisis. While framed 
between these two parties, the review does illustrate the ideas circulating in the British 
parliament at the time. In the document under the scrutiny of the cabinet, the Liberals called 
particularly for revived industry not only through public works and trade, but also through an 
expanded programme of imperial development, which could not be forced on the Empire, but 
should be cooperation based. The cabinet reviewers noted that the report did well at assessing the 
current state of economics, but demonstrated a lack of comprehension about the nature of the 
Empire and the work of the ongoing imperial conference that year.
203
This interpretation of the 
Liberal proposals illustrates the general position of Labour at the time, which was geared toward 
internationalist foreign and imperial policy that focused on cooperation with the Commonwealth 
and League of Nations, as opposed to the development of an in-house imperial economy.
204
 This 
position drew from a pre-war Fabian tradition that rejected imperial expansion in favour of 
decentralised rule and increased imperial efficiency, as well as from post-war currents of new 
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internationalism.
205
 The Labour preoccupation with international cooperation for peace was not 
meant to overlap with imperial relations, yet nonetheless encouraged the move toward the more 
decentralised Commonwealth and coordination through the auspices of the League.
206
 It is 
therefore not surprising that, in regards to the report in question, the Labour cabinet dismissed 
the issue of imperial economics as a product of Liberal miscomprehension and an issue already 
being dealt with at the 1930 Imperial Conference. Several weeks later in a publication designed 
to respond to the aforementioned Liberal report by outlining what the government was already 
doing to resolve the unemployment crisis, cabinet stressed that both short term relief and long-
term rebuilding policies were being considered by the government, with particular emphasis on a 
limited Keynesian programme of public works as a key form of relief work, and industrial 
reorganisation to increase British competitiveness in the all important export market.
207
 In this 
publication, these primarily domestic measures were the main focus, whereas imperial 
economics were given but a cursory mention in their limited capacity to aid with unemployment, 
underscoring Labour’s general disregard of the Empire in favour of social welfare and 
international coordination.
208
 In both of these documents the development of an imperial 
economy was written off by the Labour government as an approach of limited potential.  
The theme of Labour’s disregard for imperial economics is also prevalent in cabinet 
documents concerning preparations for the 1930 Imperial Conference. For example, a report on 
Empire trade drafted as an advance briefing for the conference noted that while imperial trade 
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and emigration had been key components of British programme for economic recovery in the 
1920s, the Depression had greatly limited these as viable options due to the decline of Dominion 
economies. The report argues that due to the effects of the Depression in the self-governing 
Empire, both imperial trade and the capacity of the Dominions to assist British unemployment 
through settlement schemes had been severely reduced. In light of these new limitations, Britain 
was receiving fewer benefits, and could therefore offer less to the Dominions in reciprocation. 
Within this context the report further specified that British economic weakness had resulted in a 
reduced share in Dominion markets, and that ultimately foreign trade was more important than 
trade with the Dominions. Thus, while preference from the Dominions was beneficial to the 
British economy, those preferences could not be reciprocated to the same degree, and 
consequently, the British could offer little more than development loans to fill the disparity in 
economic benefits.
209
 For this reason any type of negotiation for imperial preference, whether for 
tariffs or selective bulk purchasing, carried the risk of offending the Dominions by a lack of 
economic engagement or conversely, of alienating more valuable foreign trading partners.
210
 As 
such, in spite of economic topics featuring prominently in conference agenda, British delegates 
at the 1930 Imperial Conference were instructed to cautiously approach the subject of imperial 
preference, avoiding it if possible in order to prevent a spirit of economic bargaining from being 
fostered at the conference that would supplant the feelings of imperial fraternity they were trying 
to engender.
211
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The apparent lack of confidence in imperial economics in these documents is arguably a 
mark of the Labour government, which placed more faith in international trade, domestic 
recovery, and welfare development.  However, this is not to say that the entire Labour cabinet 
was opposed to some kind of imperial economic agreement. Occupying a post created in 1925 to 
facilitate cooperation in the emergent Commonwealth, Secretary of State for the Dominions J. H. 
Thomas urged his cabinet colleagues to reconsider their conference position to offer something 
to the Dominions for the sake of the Labour party’s political position. Thomas argued that if the 
conference ended in confusion and without resolve, the Labour government would have no one 
to blame but themselves and would “...thereby [be] cutting our own political throats...”212 He 
advised the cabinet that an imperial wheat quota, which would be a minimum commitment at no 
cost to Britain, or even a strong statement of intent to build imperial economic cooperation in 
future, could be enough to increase Britain’s bargaining position with the Dominions, and would 
be politically advantageous to the Labour party.
213
 Thomas' colleagues took note of his position 
and a wheat quota to ensure a share of the British market for Dominion producers was included 
in the conference agenda.
214
 
However, in spite of Thomas’ efforts and the incorporation of a wheat quota into the 
conference agenda, the goals of the British delegates at the conference fell short. In terms of 
economics, the outcomes of the conference were inconclusive. Although economic questions 
were addressed during the conference, these largely concerned economic miscellany which, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proceed with the conference, while maintaining a non-committal stance on imperial preferences. See: TNA: CAB 
23/65, CP 63(30) Conclusions, 24 October, 1930.  
212
 TNA: CAB 24/216, CP 366(30), The Imperial Conference, Memorandum, 27 October, 1930.   
213
 Ibid.   
214
 Imperial Conference 1930: Part 1, Summary of Proceedings (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer to the King’s Most 
Excellent Majesty, 1931), 3.  
71 
 
while important, kept discussion on imperial preference to a minimum.
215
 Throughout the 
conference the Dominions called for precisely the system of imperial preference and increased 
imperial trade that the British delegation was trying to avoid, further drawing out negotiations.
216
 
For example, in the opening speeches, when British delegates called for cooperation and unity in 
response to the crisis, Dominion delegates agreed that cooperation was necessary, but responded 
that while there were natural divisions within the Empire, imperial economics and preference 
were the most pressing issue at hand, not the unity of the Empire or the status of the Dominions, 
which had been largely addressed at the 1926 Conference. Issues of imperial unity and economic 
independence were interrelated, but Dominion delegates specified between constitutional and 
economic debates, and stressed that the current conference should focus on economics, and in 
particular, a comprehensive system of imperial preference.
 217
 The result was Dominion counter 
points to most of the limited British propositions and deadlock in key debates.  Notwithstanding 
progress on the more miscellaneous topics of the agenda, the key debate over a comprehensive 
imperial tariff system remained unresolved. Consequently, due to time constraints, the economic 
section of the conference would have to be deferred for later consideration at Ottawa, which was 
to be scheduled within twelve months of the 1930 Conference’s adjournment. In the meantime, 
the United Kingdom and Dominions resolved to set three year guarantees on what limited 
preferences existed, pending the results of the Ottawa Conference  and the hopeful resolution of 
the postponed economic debates.
218
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The remainder of the 1930 Conference was largely spent addressing constitutional issues, 
and while the long-term benefit of those more politico-legal outcomes is debated by historians, 
these were at least successful in terms of being constructive. The chief outcome of these debates 
and deliberations was the Statue of Westminster, which officially created the Commonwealth by 
legally enshrining the equality of the Dominions that was declared, but not officially enacted 
with the Balfour Declaration in 1926.
219
 These debates expressed fears of both imperial 
disintegration, as well as accusations of the British simply reinforcing their superiority with 
token equality.
220
 With little to no economic progress, and an internally divisive political result in 
both theoretical and applied terms, it is little wonder that commentators at the time perceived a 
wave of economic nationalism taking root in the Dominions and driving them and Great Britain 
apart.
221
  
In 1931 the spreading Depression precipitated a new phase of economic collapse in 
Europe. American financial disengagement contributed to the failure of the Creditanstalt bank in 
Austria, which had serious repercussions across the continent.
222
 The failure of the Creditanstalt 
bank began a chain reaction in Europe’s integrated financial system which largely relied on 
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British banking and financial infrastructure.
223
 These British institutions however, had lost a 
great deal of capital to the United States during the War, and as such were not yet sufficiently 
recovered to deal with financial failure on this scale. While anticipating the recovery of the 
pound after the re-introduction of the gold standard in 1925, British banks had been providing 
long-term loans to Europe to encourage stability, but had been borrowing money on a short term 
basis while waiting for financial recovery. Consequently, the domino effect through European 
finance resulted in British banks being unable to recover their long-term loans as banks failed on 
the continent, and as such were without the capital to pay for their short-term borrowing.
224
 This 
chain reaction undermined the financial systems of Britain and Europe, becoming a positive 
feedback loop of economic decline, which was arguably the moment that the Depression fully 
impacted Europe and spurred the coming policy changes in Britain and the wider Empire.
225
 
As the economic situation deteriorated in Europe, the Ottawa Conference was postponed, 
in part to give cabinet time to deal with the crisis, but also, to avoid the potential strain on 
imperial relations in the wake of the abortive talks of 1930 and the deterioration of both British 
and Dominion economics in 1931.
226
 This delay is telling in regards to the mood of the British 
government and people at the time, as well as for the importance of economic policy to imperial 
relations. To readdress the original research question of whether economic crisis fostered 
cooperation or division among the members of the emerging Commonwealth, the delay of the 
Ottawa Conference over political fears suggests that economic crisis and its accompanying mood 
of doom drove members apart, causing isolationistic fragmentation at a time when economic 
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recovery demanded coordination.
227
  Yet contrary to the British postponement of the conference, 
Dominion calls to deal with economic issues at the 1930 Conference, and the retrospective 
knowledge that imperial cooperation would increase after the Ottawa Conference, it seems that 
cooperation was nonetheless desired by the Dominions, if not Britain. This disparity could be a 
result of the structural arguments presented by some authors, suggesting that Dominion and 
British places within an imperial economy dictated their level of interest in expanding imperial 
economics. The artificial equality that some statesmen saw in the Statute of Westminster 
arguably applied to economics as well.
228
 In spite of developments in the Dominions’ 
manufacturing economies and the gradual dissipation of a colonial economic model, the 
Commonwealth arguably still functioned within the broader confines of a colonial economic 
model. In a system designed for primary resources to flow from the Empire to the metropole, and 
manufactured goods to flow in the inverse, the British obsession with exports and free trade as 
the economic solution to their economic woes, and Dominion calls for more Empire based trade 
to boost their economies is logical. These lingering structural elements exhibit Dominion 
economic links to the United Kingdom, in spite of increasing connections abroad.
229
 To the 
British cabinet, this difference of position represented the risk of alienating valuable foreign 
trading partners, or more politically valuable Dominions. In an effort to maintain non-offensive 
policies between working with international or Dominion countries until the economic situation 
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could be somewhat stabilised, the United Kingdom postponed the Ottawa Conference.  This 
allowed British statesmen to perpetuate the “strictly non-committal” and hopefully non-offensive 
stance of the 1920s for at least one more year, in spite of the fact that such a stance was growing 
increasingly untenable since the onset of the Depression and especially after its further 
deterioration in 1931.
230
 
The attempt to maintain a non-committal stance to imperial trade, and thus juggle 
imperial and world economic systems in spite of the worsening crisis, was evident throughout 
the year following the 1930 Conference, and set the stage for the fall of the Labour government.  
By January of 1931, in regards to domestic policy the Labour cabinet was expressing concern 
about the amount being expended on unemployment insurance, and that raised taxes were not 
securing sufficient funds for those welfare costs.
231
 As unemployment mounted, the government 
nonetheless approved increased funds for the Unemployment Insurance Act, and sought to fine 
tune the act to improve its efficiency and remove potential abuses of the dole.
232
 At the same 
time, cabinet recognised that these increased payments could only be temporary, and that real 
economic recovery would require a reorganisation of industry on a larger scale that would not 
produce results for at least a year.
233
 In the interim, the government moved to diversify public 
works projects in conjunction with the increased funds for unemployment insurance.
234
 Yet these 
orthodox policies were not enough and as French commentator André Siegfried noted at the 
time, the English system became trapped in a positive feedback loop in which the lack of exports 
caused unemployment, yet unemployment insurance and public works focused government 
investment into domestic projects, which reinforced unemployment into a tax - dole - tax cycle 
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without improving the vital export sector.
235
 Siegfried’s work was very critical of the British 
system, and predictably upheld French methods as superior, but he did identify a key issue that 
challenged the British government in 1931. Siegfried argued that in order to restart the export 
markets it so desperately needed, the United Kingdom would have to increase its foreign 
investment, but in order to do so would need to cut unemployment benefits and thereby lower the 
standard of living in England, which was higher than elsewhere in Europe and, according to 
Siegfried, irresponsible.
236
 This problem represented the deadweight of orthodox economic 
thought as applied to the British domestic economy through which welfare measures were used 
to fill the gap while waiting for gold-standard based free trade to rebound.
237
  
In terms of the international economics on which free trade depended, the financial crisis 
and subsequent lack of capital in London also presented an impasse for the government. The lack 
of capital due to war debt and the imbalance of short and long-term lending, as well as the 
adherence to free-trade economic orthodoxy ultimately divided the Labour government over the 
choice of abandoning free trade by setting up tariffs, or by implementing austerity measures and 
cutting unemployment relief.
238
 Simultaneously attempting to avoid austerity as much as possible 
according to their commitment to welfare and the working class, and attempting to maintain gold 
standard free-trade rather than turning to a closed or imperial economy ultimately led to the fall 
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of the Labour government in 1931, and a new national government representing all major parties 
took over by the end of the year.
239
  
In his 1944 work The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi argues that the European 
financial crisis in 1931 and the subsequent abandonment of the gold standard by one nation after 
another represented the fall of the last bastion of a nineteenth-century civilisation centered on a 
self-regulating market economy upheld by a balance of power, liberal states, and the gold 
standard. By commoditising both mankind and his environment in the form of wages and 
resources, that economy had threatened the traditional fabric of Western society, which 
subconsciously rebelled to destroy the market economy that would annihilate it.
240
 Thus, he 
characterises the fall of the gold standard in Europe as the dramatic conclusion of macro-level 
historical narrative that marked the end of both traditional society, and the era of self-regulating 
markets that had precipitated that society’s destruction.241 Polanyi’s work captures the gravity of 
these events and, although such macro-level arguments are always cause for debate among 
historians, one undeniable component of Polanyi’s argument was that at the time Europe was 
obsessed with currency stability, and that in Britain the left was pushed out of office in the name 
of that stability.
242
 Within weeks of the Labour government’s fall from office and the subsequent 
fragmentation of the party, the new national government was re-evaluating the British economic 
position and beginning to dismantle the older economic orthodoxy of gold standard based free 
trade. Within a month of taking office, the new cabinet saw a report from the Committee of 
Economists of the Economic Advisory Council which outlined a novel economic programme in 
response to the Depression. The report noted that while free trade was generally a good thing for 
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Britain, in order for it to function, trade also had to exist in the first place. Consequently, 
protective tariffs could be useful for rebuilding industry back to the point where tariffs would no 
longer be necessary.
243
 The report recommended that a full protective tariff should be 
implemented. However, the accompanying risk of economic isolation led to a further 
recommendation that a system of imperial preference be reconsidered as a middle ground 
between national isolation and open free trade. The report noted that the Dominions had become 
increasingly protectionist and were not in a negotiating mood which, after the lack of British 
economic cooperation at the 1930 Conference was hardly surprising. The report nonetheless 
recommended that a system of imperial preference should be proposed at the Ottawa Conference 
the following year. The underlying message was that if more preferable free trade did not 
improve in world markets, an imperial system would be better than no trade. Furthermore, by 
initiating both a national tariff and proposing imperial preference, the British government would 
have two attainable strategies for economic recovery which could be immediately implemented, 
thus filling the urgent need to do something about the crisis, while simultaneously giving the 
British government political credibility at home, and more negotiating power with the 
increasingly divergent Dominions.
244
 No matter the success of these measures, it was stated that 
both preferential tariffs for the Empire and a general tariff for Britain would be temporary for the 
duration of the Depression, but were nonetheless necessary for economic recovery given the 
failure of more orthodox measures in the face of the Depression.
245
  
Steps toward the implementation of this new direction of policy were quickly enacted and 
the government received a range of new powers with which to regulate the economy including 
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the power to make orders in council and to coordinate certain sectors of the economy to improve 
monetary flows and overall economic efficiency.
246
 The budget for that year was also 
reconfigured and included a section granting the treasury more regulatory rights and general 
powers.
247
 Due to the untested nature of an expanded governmental role in the economy and the 
unpredictability of world economics, as a safeguard for British consumers this new 
interventionism was accompanied by provisions granting new powers to the Board of Trade to 
prevent food price increases or food shortages in Britain, as well as the power to levee new 
duties on certain imports to protect domestic agricultural producers.
248
  
Coinciding with these preliminary measures to facilitate the government’s role in the 
economy and to increase the regulation of trade, two major interconnected policies were ushered 
in. The first of these was the abandonment of the Gold Standard in September of 1931.
249
 The 
failure of international free trade to rally around a gold-based pound after its reestablishment in 
1925 undermined the British attempt to create a bloc of standardised currencies in Europe. 
Without meaningful monetary engagement from the United States, and after the failure of the 
European financial system in 1931, in order to save the British banking system there was little 
option left but for the United Kingdom to abandon the gold-standard and with it the goal of re-
establishing the pre-1914 economy.
250
  The abandonment of the gold standard initially caused a 
wave of fluctuating currency exchange rates abroad, and some increased unemployment in the 
United Kingdom; however, after a period of adjustment, now with cheaper money Britain was 
able to become more competitive in the ever-vital export sector, and while recovery still seemed 
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distant, cabinet was increasingly confident in the stability of the pound, and the potential to use 
stable currency as the basis for wider economic recovery.
251
  
Closely linked to the abandonment of the gold standard was the end of the longstanding 
British commitment to free trade. Beyond the small scale protective tariffs of the 1925 
Safeguarding Industries Act, the Abnormal Importations Act of 1931 began with a broader range 
of tariffs, largely applied to agricultural imports. The following year the Import Duties Act ended 
British free trade altogether with the introduction of a general tariff on all goods, rather than the 
select goods specified in preceding legislation.
252
  
Combined, the emergency measures initiated by the national government represented a 
clear departure from the pre-war orthodoxy of gold-standard based free trade and set the stage 
for British policy at the upcoming Ottawa Conference. Although the goals of British delegates 
incorporated the continuation of previous policies in the sense that imperial preference, 
settlement, and development were still the main foci of discussion, the context in, and degree to 
which they negotiated these topics had been vastly changed.
253
 The introduction of the general 
tariff by nature threatened any sort of imperial preference, and had risked no small degree of 
tension with the Dominions. Consequently, the Dominions were exempted from the provisions of 
the Import Duties Act until after the conclusion of the Ottawa Conference, when the projected 
outcomes of the conference would take precedent over the blanket duties of the general tariff.
254
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It was within this context of economic crisis, novel emergency policies, and underlying discord 
in the nascent Commonwealth that preparations for the Ottawa Conference were made.  
3. The Ottawa Conference 
After the embittering effects of both economic and political disputes at the 1930 Imperial 
Conference, and the subsequent year of increased economic downturn and the implementation of 
promising, but unfamiliar policies, the pressure to reach some kind of economic resolve in 
Ottawa was high.
255
 The British Cabinet concluded that failure in Ottawa would be unacceptable, 
and that flagging negotiations should be resurrected and re-approached until successful 
agreements were reached with each of the Dominions.
256
 The stakes were high not only for 
Britain, but also for wider world economics through enduring British financial dominance. The 
importance of the upcoming Ottawa Conference was recognised by commentators throughout the 
Commonwealth. Amongst these commentators, the most varied opinions emerged from the least 
homogenously British Dominions.
257
 Canada, as the host for the conference, as well as the oldest 
and most economically developed Dominion, which also incorporated two major linguistic 
groups, was arguably the most potent site of commentator debate. For the purposes of this 
project, the works of Canadian authors provide a good case study of Dominion ideas and debates 
leading up to the Ottawa Conference.  
Canadian Anglophone and Francophone scholars agreed that because the global economy 
failed to rally, an immediate increase in imperial trade was desirable, as the Empire could 
provide a smaller, more manageable and more cooperative platform for rebuilding a stable 
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currency and trade, which would ultimately provide a foundation for world recovery.
258
 There 
was however, contestation over the purpose and method of that recovery with Canadian opinions 
divided along linguistic lines. Anglophone authors recognised Dominion economic dependence 
on the Empire, but argued that increased imperial trade through the Ottawa Conference was as a 
chance to rebuild the imperial system into a new economic model not only to serve the recently 
established Commonwealth, but also as an example of economic cooperation for capitalism and 
the world.
259
 However, Francophone authors such as journalist Léopold Richer disagreed.  He 
argued that it would be naive to think that Great Britain would sacrifice its own interests for the 
sake of the wider Empire, and that at the conference, Britain would beat the Dominions in 
negotiations, ultimately gaining much more than they gave, all the while further cementing the 
colonial style economic system, which would be both divisive and an inefficient solution to the 
Depression, particularly for the Dominions.
260
 That being said, Richer did recognise a point 
which, while quite relevant to Canada, also featured prominently in wider imperial preparations 
for the conference. This was that the United States was a much more expedient trading partner 
for Canada and the other Dominions, but that it was too unstable to be of much use during the 
crisis. American isolationism and protectionism had severely restricted the flow of American 
capital to Europe, which arguably laid much of the groundwork for the financial collapse in 
Europe in 1930-31. Protectionism in the United States was best represented by the Smoot 
Hawley Act of 1930 which imposed tariffs up to fifty percent on international goods, and 
severely limited the American presence in international trade. Meanwhile, ongoing talks about 
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increased American involvement in world economics added further uncertainty about American 
intentions, as the United States exhibited these dichotomous pursuits, all the while absent from 
the League of Nations; the central forum for international coordination.
261
  In light of American 
unpredictability, the Empire would be a much more stable platform upon which to rebuild trade, 
not because it was the best long-term option, but because it was the only viable one at the time, 
leaving both the Dominions and Great Britain to pursue Empire trade out of expediency, rather 
than long-term value.
262
  
Incorporating interpretations from a Canadian point of view as a case study in 
Commonwealth opinion, as well as British policy up to 1932, the consensus of these sources is 
that due to the failure of world trade to recover based on traditional methods, the pursuit of an 
accord at the Ottawa Conference became the best alternative for both Britain and the Dominions. 
However, although this consensus was reached in 1932, the Dominions had been pushing for a 
more comprehensive imperial economy for some time prior to the Depression, while the United 
Kingdom attempted to balance free trade and non-commitment to an imperial economy 
throughout the 1920s. This difference of approach brings to mind D.K. Fieldhouse’s argument 
that in a long term perspective, there had been debate in Britain over the merits of an open world 
or a closed-imperial economic system and that prior to 1914 the Empire was beneficial, but non-
essential.
263
 Fieldhouse elaborates that the Empire proved to be a saving grace during the First 
World War, leading to more preferential treatment in the interwar period, although not enough to 
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compete with free markets, leaving world and imperial economies in a “crude balanc[e]”.264 The 
highpoint of imperial trade in the wake of the Ottawa Conference would not have been attainable 
before the Depression was at its worst, which broke the balancing act in British policy, as well as 
the political deadlock both in Britain, and between Britain and the Dominions after the 1930 
Imperial Conference.
265
  Fieldhouse presents a novel caveat by specifying that a protectionist 
economy was not politically possible in Britain until the Depression was at its worst. Most 
scholars agree that the significant policy departure in Britain often characterised as the result of a 
struggle between laissez-faire free traders and imperial visionaries or between Labour and 
Conservative economic strategies, was a product of the Depression, particularly between its 
further deterioration in 1931 and the institution of comprehensive imperial preference in 1932.
266
 
However, the specification that this policy shift had not been possible prior to the Depression 
adds further weight to the role of British politics in dictating responses to the Depression, or  at 
very least, in limiting those responses. Thus, the combined pressures of the Depression, and the 
weight of British politics on responses to the crisis formed the context for the United Kingdom’s 
preparations for the Ottawa Conference.  
A. Preparations for Ottawa 
The British cabinet and delegation prepared extensively for the Ottawa Conference. By 
late 1931, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa was informed of the British negotiating 
strategy for the conference, which was largely based on reciprocation. The commissioner was 
instructed that no concessions should be made to the Dominions without corresponding 
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concessions being received by Britain, a somewhat ironic position given the history of 
unreciprocated preferences extended by the Dominions to Britain in the past.267 The concessions 
the British wished to receive from each Dominion were drawn up in lists and had been reviewed 
by the Federation of British Industries to ensure these would be of definite benefit to Britain 
without sacrificing the interests of domestic industry.268 Recognising that member-specific 
concessions, while practical, had the potential to be dangerously divisive for the Empire, 
concessions were to be presented in terms of long-term imperial interests, with emphasis placed 
on the renewal process and continued preferences, rather than as a short term measure, in spite of 
the fact that cabinet viewed imperial preference as precisely that.269 The delegation was further 
instructed that failed agreements should be renegotiated until reciprocally beneficial conclusions 
could be reached, provided international trade conditions did not improve in the interim, which 
could potentially afford the British delegation some leeway with foreign options as bargaining 
chips.270  
In addition to equipping its delegation with bargaining tools and outlining a negotiation 
strategy, the British government was also preparing for upcoming conferences on disarmament 
and war reparation payments in Geneva and Lausanne respectively. While these conferences had 
less to do with imperial economics, they did result in a smaller British delegation to Ottawa in 
order to save conference costs, illustrating that Britain still sought to engage in wider political 
and economic fields, rather than placing total priority on imperial economic cooperation in 
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Ottawa.
271
 Further illustrating this point was the British negotiation of a trade deal with the 
Soviet Union in the spring of 1932 which delegates would later use as a bargaining chip at the 
Ottawa Conference.
272
  
The British government also prepared for the Ottawa Conference by opening preliminary 
talks with individual Dominions and encouraging them to speed their preparations in order to 
facilitate the negotiation process.
273
 Since the departure from the gold standard the year before, 
cabinet’s Economic Advisory Council had noted increased British competitiveness in export 
markets. Noting the benefits of cheaper, non-gold based money, the council recommended that 
stable sterling currency should be developed as the basis of further international recovery, and 
incorporated the desire to strengthen the sterling zone into British rhetoric at the conference, in 
spite of financial reconstruction not appearing on the conference agenda.
274
 While the sterling 
zone was not limited to the Empire, it was largely based therein, so by opening preliminary 
negotiations and encouraging financial cooperation with the Dominions, the British government 
was both working to facilitate a successful conclusion to the Ottawa Conference, and working 
toward wider world economic recovery.  
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Furthermore, in order to encourage successful negotiations, in the months leading up to 
the conference, the British government also avoided any potentially inflammatory policies. For 
example, for politico-strategic reasons relating to Middle Eastern oil and the security of the Suez 
Canal, in April of 1932 cabinet debated extending preferential tariffs to the British mandate of 
Palestine. Recognising that such a move could prove offensive in the League of Nations, as well 
as to the Dominions to whom Britain had not yet accorded a comprehensive system of imperial 
preference, cabinet resolved to postpone discussion of the issue until after the conclusion of the 
Ottawa Conference.
275
 
B. The Conference Itself 
Having initiated preparations internally, internationally, and imperially, the British 
government met Dominion leaders in Ottawa. By most accounts, the ensuing negotiations of the 
conference itself were intense and sometimes bitter, particularly between the United Kingdom 
and Canada and Australia, the most economically developed of the Dominions and arguably the 
most economically nationalistic.
276
 Although some British economic analysts and historians later 
claimed that the Dominions got the most out of the Ottawa Conference, the resolutions of the 
conference nonetheless echo the direction of British policy under the national government.
 277
 In 
this policy direction, the Empire was viewed as a reserve economic system for times of 
emergency, to be used as a temporary measure to protect domestic industry and a platform for 
stable sterling currency with which to begin international economic recovery, and thus the 
recovery of freer trade. This policy direction was echoed in the conference conclusions, which 
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recognised that the Ottawa Agreements should take precedent over new trade agreements with 
foreign countries, but that the agreements could not overrule certain existing commercial treaties, 
and that the Commonwealth should actively work with other countries to move toward economic 
recovery. The inclusion of these points on the application of the Ottawa Agreements vis-à-vis 
non-imperial trade agreements was framed in imperial rhetoric, but nonetheless provided a 
loophole for the maintenance of extra-imperial trade; illustrating that even at the height of 
imperial economic cooperation, the promotion of international trade was still a key 
consideration.
278
 Similarly, it was also noted that the Commonwealth would work together to 
provide a stable sterling area for financial recovery, a system which the conference recognised 
was facilitated by the United Kingdom’s preparation of the economic machinery of the sterling 
zone.
279
 Even in the reports from various conference committees similar points were re-
expressed, such as the removal of trade barriers within the Empire and the recommendation that 
the Commonwealth follow Britain’s lead in stabilising currency through the sterling zone.280 The 
focus on promoting freer world trade is quite reminiscent of British policy through the 
Depression, which advocated building imperial trade, but still emphasised decreasing barriers to 
international trade and establishing a strong sterling zone in order to facilitate wider world 
recovery. 
281
 
Apart from these items, the conference also heavily recommended standardisation of 
industry, trade and finance to facilitate imperial trade and coordination in future.
282
 The heavy 
emphasis on standardising trade facilities such as ports, industrial organisation, units of 
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measurements, and bureaucratic conventions may appear to be at odds with lingering British 
free-trade sentiment by physically cementing an imperial trade system, at least to a higher degree 
than the structure of the Empire had already done. However, standardisation would strengthen 
the sterling zone, and in more tangible terms could also be applied to strategic purposes such as 
defence. Thus, standardisation could simultaneously be a part of an imperial system and an open 
world economy without necessarily being in contradiction with one another, or with the grander 
politico-economic aims of the British government.  
4. Imperial Economics After Ottawa 
The structure of imperial conferences, from their creation in 1887, was based on 
discussion and coordination rather than the authority to legislate. Consequently, the discussion at 
the 1932 Conference was the crucial starting point for policies, while actual implementation 
occurred afterwards. In the wake of the Ottawa Conference, as agreements were formulated into 
legislation, the British cabinet concluded that the conference had been successful in establishing 
a system of imperial preference, while reducing tariffs more generally, and that a corresponding 
increase in trade with the Dominions was set to take place in the months following the 
conference.
283
 Cabinet did note with concern, however, that the United Kingdom had lost 
influence in imperial markets due to foreign competition, and arguably its own lack of 
engagement with the Empire, which caused the Dominions especially to seek alternative 
economic partnerships. However, this loss of market shares was discussed by cabinet not for the 
role it would play in slowing the growth of imperial trade after Ottawa, but for the concerns it 
raised about imperial unity. Noting that the economic ties reinforced at Ottawa would not 
compensate for prior economic disassociation with Britain and the political independence 
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granted with the Statute of Westminster, cabinet members feared that if not for routine imperial 
conferences, the remaining British sentiment in the Empire would succumb to Dominion 
nationalism and the bonds of Empire would be dissolved.
284
 This demonstrates continuity with 
previous British policy, if not in structure then in sentiment. In the conference proceedings, the 
lingering commitment to world free trade and the accompanying use of imperial preference as an 
alternative economy is evident.  In the context of this document however, while the 
disassociation of Dominion and British economies was noted, this trend was not discussed as a 
matter of real concern except in terms of imperial unity, as opposed to economics. Thus, in this 
discussion the preoccupation with more political conceptions of unity and the apparent lack of 
concern over lost Dominion markets again demonstrates the lingering commitment to freer world 
trade. There is much evidence for the persistence of these free trade ideas in spite of the imperial 
preference established at Ottawa, and in spite of any Conservative bid to create a protectionist 
economy. Particularly later in the 1930s, trade policy gradually reverted to policies of freer trade, 
but in the interim British delegates advocated for free trade within the Empire, and even as the 
Ottawa Agreements were enacted, the British government made sure to include the condition that 
should the Dominion governments not uphold the concessions promised at the conference, the 
United Kingdom could revoke the Ottawa Agreements. 
285
  
Even under a government arguably dominated by protectionist Conservatives, the British 
commitment to free trade and a predominantly international, rather than imperial economic 
strategy is evident in reports of the Cabinet Economic Advisory Council. For example, even as 
the Ottawa Agreements Act was still being finalised, a report on international economic policy in 
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October of 1932 stressed that financial and economic recovery were connected, and therefore, 
temporary trade restrictions such as tariffs  must be endured only until such time as world 
finance was stabilised and world recovery could begin.
286
 The same report encouraged cabinet to 
set quotas for international purchases up to the limits of the Ottawa Agreements in order to 
stimulate international trade.
287
 This demonstrates that while Britain had committed to the 
imperial economy at an unprecedented level, it still desired increased business abroad. This 
report supports the position among historians that the imperial preferential system implemented 
at Ottawa was seen as a temporary system by the British government, and that an imperial 
economy was more useful in its capacity as a platform from which to stabilise international 
currencies via sterling, and thus promote the recovery of freer-markets.
288
 This strategy seemed 
to work as by November of 1932 The Economic Advisory Council noted that the Depression had 
turned a corner and that a return of financial and commercial confidence was helping some 
recovery to begin. Whether that recovery was sustainable remained undecided, but the return of 
confidence was seen as a preliminary step that was needed prior to removing impediments to 
international trade.
289
 This report again highlights that removing trade obstacles remained a 
priority for Britain, and that financial confidence based on a secure currency was a prerequisite 
to free trade, and one which was beginning to rally in the wake of the Ottawa Conference.
290
  
The provisions of the Ottawa Conference continued to set the tone for British economic 
policy for several years following 1932, yet always with the tension of persisting free trade ideals 
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in competition with the newly expanded imperial system.  This demonstrated the growing 
importance of imperial economics within a system habituated to, and still ultimately working 
toward world economics. This tension persisted at least until the next imperial conference in 
1937, although it was much less evident in British domestic policy, in which the Keynesian 
strategies of expanded and diversified unemployment insurance and programmes, as well as 
public works projects were continued as per the status quo established by the national 
government in late 1931.
291
 However, in an international and imperial sense, the previous 
strategy of free trade, while still present and apparently preferred by many members of the 
government, was now subordinate to a reconfigured strategy based on an expedient imperial 
economic system.
292
 For example, while briefings of the American and world financial situation 
were regularly circulated to the cabinet around the time of the conference, imperial briefings 
were relatively rare, with the majority of matters concerning the Dominions being mentioned on 
a case-by-case basis within these wider trade reports.
293
 However, after the Ottawa Conference 
and the accompanying move to implement the conference resolutions, imperial concerns 
increasingly occupied cabinet discussions. Although dedicated imperial economic reports were 
uncommon for the period, this scarcity was accounted for in the size of the reports and volume of 
material they reviewed. One such lengthy cabinet economic report from 1933 detailed not only 
the implementation of imperial preference, but also the intricacies of imperial coordination such 
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as economic cooperation and information sharing, coordinating bodies, marketing, development 
strategies, as well as the costs of this infrastructure and cost sharing among the Dominions.
294
 
The increasing presence of imperial issues in cabinet discussion after 1932 corresponded to an 
increasing prevalence of Empire-related legislation. After the initial implementation of the 
Ottawa trade agreements with the Ottawa Agreements Act of 1932, the subsequent budgets in 
1933 and 1934 featured adjustments to certain tariffs in order to fine tune the system of imperial 
preference and deal with any inconsistencies between the general tariff of the Import Duties Act 
and the commodity by commodity approach used in the Ottawa Agreements.
295
  
From 1932 through 1934 the increased concern for imperial economics was continued, all 
the while offset by a keen awareness of the state of international economics. Behind closed doors 
cabinet expressed anxiety over American unpredictability in economic policy.
296
 At the 1933 
World Economic and Monetary Conference the themes of currency stabilisation and balancing 
exchange rates dominated the discussion. While noting both the potential power of American 
finance and calls for Britain to lead currency reform by creating an international monetary 
system based on the gold-standard, the British cabinet resolved that the gold standard would not 
be revisited, and that all international discussion about the gold-standard should be approached 
cautiously, and avoided if possible.
297
 While attempting to avoid another unsuccessful return to 
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the gold standard and lead world financial recovery, British economic leadership would depend 
on capital from American banks, yet several months before the United States had also left the 
gold-standard, and were now seeking to avoid currency stabilisation at fixed exchange rates, to 
allow the dollar to depreciate and this make American exports more competitive. The result was 
that even prior to the 1933World Conference convening in London, there was a pre-determined 
conflict of interest between Britain with its new focus on the sterling zone, continental European 
countries seeking stable currency based on the gold standard and the still isolated United 
States.
298
 The conference was ultimately unsuccessful after the United States “torpedoed” the 
conference by rejecting its final draft resolution, a move which some argue helped encourage 
economic nationalism rather cooperation, as it was seen that one country could undermine any 
attempts at international cooperation .
299
 
It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of setbacks such as the 1933 World 
Economic and Monetary Conference and concern over American actions, cabinet nonetheless 
noted improving trade conditions by 1934.
300
 Explanations for this recovery range from a more 
stable pound-sterling, to increased international cooperation to the turning of a trade cycle, to the 
impacts of increased imperial preference.
301
 Although explanations are seldom monocausal, in 
this case the role of imperial preference can be incorporated as a factor into each of the 
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explanations, as it provided a financial foundation upon which the pound could recover, 
demonstrated increased cooperation between now constitutionally independent states, and by 
increasing linkages between Commonwealth economies, would compound the benefits of a 
cyclical upturn and thus promote recovery much more so than an upturn in an individual country.  
It is worth noting that whatever the cause, as this initial recovery took hold into the mid 1930s, 
cabinet increasingly returned to rhetoric of freer international trade, reversing the shift toward the 
imperial trade in the wake of the Ottawa Conference. For example, when conditions began to 
improve in 1934, the British export sector began to re-establish itself. However, the initial 
recovery in British exports was not to imperial, but foreign markets.
302
 This was not to say that 
imperial trade had been unproductive, as it had continually expanded since the Ottawa 
Conference, and was reflected in the British export sector later in 1934.
303
 Yet even with a short 
lag of several months between the exports rebound between international and imperial markets, 
by the end of that year cabinet was discussing how to juggle Empire and foreign trade to 
maximise gain without transgressing trade agreements. That year cabinet also approved 
legislation that would allow parliament to restrict imports from both foreign, and Empire 
countries, in certain cases allowing trade caps to be imposed in spite of the Ottawa 
Agreements.
304
 In this manner, the British government maintained the Ottawa Agreements, but 
was evidently posturing for a return to free-trade. By 1935, British economic analysts had 
perceived that the world economy had already bottomed out and thus when planning its policy 
for the next few years the government could anticipate a period of readjustment and overall 
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recovery.
305
 In a cabinet paper from July of that year entitled “The Economic Outlook for the 
Next Few Years” imperial trade was expected to continue to grow as British export markets 
shifted to the Empire and sterling zone due to the more long-term effects of the Ottawa 
Agreements. However, the paper noted that Dominion trade was a complicated matter, and that 
only for the time being, the Empire should continue to be used as the basis for financial 
stabilisation before other options could be explored.
306
 In essence, this report recognised the role 
of the imperial system in British recovery, but looked forward to reopening free trade once a 
sufficient threshold of recovery had been reached. 
By the time planning for the 1937 Imperial Conference began it was clear that the Ottawa 
Agreements had become a fait accompli, with the bundle of agreements now being maintained as 
static as possible. In private the British cabinet frankly stated its desire to deal with the 
agreements bilaterally rather than in a conference setting, and more subtly suggested this 
approach to the Dominions as planning process for the next conference was initiated in 1936.
307
 
The apparent reversion to older economic strategies of limiting imperial preferences, but within a 
new bilateral framework is not to say that the Ottawa Agreements had been unsuccessful. 
Imperial trade had increased after the Ottawa Conference, and did bring benefits to all parties. 
However, free trade would always have the potential to be more profitable than imperial trade 
simply by virtue of larger available markets. Consequently, by December of 1936 cabinet 
concluded that the recovery of the United Kingdom was largely thanks to trade with the Empire, 
but full recovery could not be achieved without cooperation and trade with the rest of the world. 
Therefore, imperial preferential policies should no longer be expanded, but trade increases with 
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both intra and extra-imperial partners should be equally pursued within the confines of existing 
policies.
308
 
The 1937 Imperial Conference was prefaced as an opportunity to report updates on 
agreements reached at the Ottawa Conference, but it was specified at the opening of the 
conference that apart from these updates related economic matters should be dealt with 
bilaterally between the United Kingdom and the individual Dominions, rather than during the 
conference itself.
309
 British delegates also stressed that the success of Commonwealth economies 
depended on world trade more generally, and as such the Commonwealth should work to remove 
trade barriers and promote freer flowing trade worldwide; a position rather reminiscent of British 
policy in the 1920s, although now framed with more Commonwealth terminology.
310
 The bulk of 
discussion at the 1937 Conference focused on defence coordination and political appeasement, as 
well as some constitutional issues, all the while maintaining the rhetoric of imperial unity and 
coordination.
311
 As in the years immediately following the First World War, it seems that Britain 
had less interest in economic association with the broader Empire, and was increasingly focusing 
on the Commonwealth as a military partnership in a deteriorating political world. Meanwhile 
economic relations were shifting back to recovering world markets.
312
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An example of this regressive trend in Commonwealth relations is a pair of “Survey[s] of 
the Economic Situation;” a periodic publication presented to the members of the cabinet. These 
publications were a regular feature of cabinet operations, and had been growing extensively since 
their earlier manifestations in the 1920s. In doing so they became increasingly robust and 
detailed, including much more about world trade conditions, and especially about those in the 
United States.
313
 A December 1936 survey focused primarily on gold flows, the American 
economy, and Empire economics. The survey noted that henceforth Britain would maintain, not 
expand, imperial preference.
314
 A 1938 report, a year after the next imperial conference, made 
little mention of trade within the Empire, and focused instead on American trade policy, the 
removal of barriers to free trade, as well as barriers to the buying and selling of gold and its 
relation to global currency stabilisation.
315
 The difference of these documents is the notable 
absence of a distinct section on imperial trade. This demonstrates that after the bilateral focus of 
Dominion economic negotiations that had been established at Ottawa in 1932 and reaffirmed at 
the 1937 Imperial Conference, the British government was free to focus more exclusively on 
world trade and allow imperial preference as a comprehensive system to lapse into individual 
trade bargaining as part of a wider world system. By beginning to merge imperial and world 
economics into a common area of policy, the British government would shift the bulk of 
discussion with the Commonwealth to defence and political subjects, rather than economics, as 
demonstrated by the most prominent topics of the 1937 Imperial Conference.
316
 Further evidence 
for this shift can be found several years later when, in response to a dispute over preferential 
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tariffs with South Africa, cabinet resolved that if talks could not be scheduled and the issue 
resolved the British government would denounce renewal of the Ottawa Agreement with the 
Union of South Africa.
317
 This is a striking contrast to the postponement of the Ottawa 
Conference due to tense political relations not ten years before. 
The decentralisation of economic relations in the latter half of the 1930s seemed to verify 
the fears of many commentators at the time that imperial tariff bargaining was inherently 
divisive, and that should such a system be enacted the Empire would be divided save for the 
precarious link of their common British cultural heritage.
318
 This feared decentralisation would 
see the Dominions seeking fuller economic independence while maintaining cultural ties with 
Britain as a comfortable and sentimental heritage, thus rendering the lifespan of Commonwealth, 
and by extension the Empire, equal to that of the interest of and cooperative measures taken by 
its members, rather than its institutions.
319
 This stance arguably set the stage for the role of the 
Empire in the Second World War; simultaneously promoting the economic divergence that 
would contribute to the boom of free market capitalism in the post-war years, and the cultural 
affinity that would preface Commonwealth involvement in the coming conflict.
320
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Conclusion 
By analysing the changes in British economic policy and Commonwealth interactions 
through the interwar period, this paper has demonstrated that while non-economic factors did 
play a role in dictating British economic policy, imperial economic policy was more significantly 
impacted by the Depression itself, which ultimately drove the self-governing members of the 
Commonwealth to cooperate more closely in order to overcome the economic crisis. However, 
somewhat counter-intuitively, that cooperation was the result of the ubiquitous self interest of 
Commonwealth members which, due to issues of capacity related to the imperial economic 
structure and the context of the scope of the Depression, caused both short term cooperation and 
long-term divergence of the member states.  
The interwar period was a divisive one for the Empire, with many factors driving the 
emergent Commonwealth apart. The differences between British policy and Dominion 
interactions before and after the onset of the economic crisis in 1929 demonstrate that much of 
that division was the result of the beginning of the Depression, which exacerbated existing faults 
in the imperial economic system. However, as demonstrated by the system of imperial 
preference established at Ottawa, the Depression did result in increased economic cooperation 
within the Empire, at least during the worst conditions in the early 1930s. The counterintuitive 
mixture of increased economic cooperation and increasingly divisive rhetoric complicates this 
project’s initial research question of whether economic crisis drove the members of the nascent 
Commonwealth together in cooperation, or apart in self-interest. In response to this 
complication, the terms of the original question must be reconsidered. The definition of self-
interest suggests a disregard for others in pursuit of that interest, whereas the definition of 
cooperation evokes mutual striving for a common goal. It seems that these definitions would be 
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exclusive of one another, however, the evidence suggests that in this case, cooperation and self 
interest were not mutually exclusive, and that the Depression ultimately drove the members of 
the Commonwealth to cooperate out of pragmatic self-interest, even though that cooperation was 
contrary to long-term trends of divergence (which were also fueled by the ubiquitous self-interest 
of member states). While this responds to the initial research question of the effects of the 
Depression on the Commonwealth in broad terms, it does not explain the manner in which the 
self-interested and somewhat begrudging imperial economic cooperation occurred. How this 
self-interested economic cooperation occurred was the result of the political context of the 1930s 
to a degree, but most importantly, it was the product of structural factors linked to a colonial 
economic system, and contextual factors to do with the scope of the Depression. 
Commonwealth cooperation was partly the result of the imperial structure of governance 
and economics. In a colonial model the interests of the colonies are necessarily subordinate to 
that of the mother country. In the 1920s, the Dominions, though technically self-governing had 
not yet been granted the equality of status that would officially come with the Statute of 
Westminster in 1931. The establishment of the Commonwealth was being discussed at the time, 
but the cordial cooperation of the 1923 Imperial Economic Conference occurred prior to its 
actual establishment. Consequently the decade of the 1920s was a period when the Dominions, in 
spite of their self-governing status, still interacted within a more colonial economic model in 
which their interests were automatically subordinated to those of the United Kingdom. Although 
this colonial model was not as strong in the Dominions as it was in the actual colonies of the 
Empire, the structural legacy of that colonial model remained in spite of increasing Dominion 
independence.
321
 In a colonial economic model, it is also in the best interest of the colonial 
                                                          
321
 Darwin, The End of the British Empire, 40.  
102 
 
territories to support the economic interest of the mother country on which they rely. This would 
also suggest that given persisting colonial structural elements, the Dominions would intuitively 
support the interests of the United Kingdom, even as British interest remained focused on world 
economics, with foreign and imperial policy subordinated to the domestic demand of resolving 
chronic unemployment.
322
 It is not surprising then, that Dominion delegates vied for increased 
imperial preference while simultaneously supporting British efforts to re-establish free-trade, in 
spite of freer world trade being at odds with the establishment of a preferential imperial 
economic bloc.  
Based on the rhetoric of Dominion leaders at the 1923 Conference and the later demands 
of the Dominions at the 1932 Ottawa Conference, this paper has characterized the Dominions as 
desiring increased Empire trade for their own interests, which arguably has much to do with 
structural elements of the Empire. However, one must also consider whether the Dominions had 
an interest in more open markets and were also using the imperial system as a backup economy. 
The context of the Ottawa Conference is useful for addressing this consideration because, by the 
time of the Ottawa Conference the Commonwealth had been officially established, allowing the 
Dominions the constitutional freedom to pursue alternative economic connections to a much 
fuller degree than they had in the past.
323
 For example, it was a significant constitutional 
development that the Dominions be allowed to establish their own diplomatic relations with 
foreign powers.
324
 Yet in spite of their increased independence, in 1932 the Dominions were still 
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demanding increased imperial economic ties at the Ottawa Conference. This suggests that the 
technical equality of the Commonwealth was not enough in practice to prevent the Dominions 
from being structurally subordinate to Britain, as they remained less developed in their structures 
of governance. While the Dominions technically had the equality with the United Kingdom that 
would allow them to establish commercial relations abroad, they lacked the diplomatic capacity 
to do so without British assistance.
325
 
Consequently, economic cooperation during the Depression was the outcome of 
Dominion interest versus capacity. With limited foreign policy infrastructure, the Dominions had 
a maximum horizon of awareness for world affairs and diplomatic relations and could not 
operate independently even if they desired to do so. While they were given the opportunity to use 
British officials for their own national ends, this type of diplomacy was still necessarily 
coordinated with Britain.
326
 The Dominions did begin to establish their own diplomatic services, 
but there remained a maximum horizon of information attainable without cooperating with 
Britain, so it was still in the interest of the Dominions to cooperate with the United Kingdom 
even if British policies were not entirely beneficial to the Dominions.
327
 While British analysts 
retrospectively argued that during the Ottawa Conference the Dominions were also courting the 
United States for economic advantages and got the most out of the conference by having Britain 
over the barrel, with limited capacity to engage in foreign policy, it seems doubtful that the 
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Dominions, apart from Canada for reasons of proximity, could have successfully courted the 
United States to the degree of cornering the British government in the Ottawa negotiations.
328
 
The Dominions were increasing their trade with foreign partners during the interwar period more 
generally, but in both the 1920s and in the 1930s, structural reasons contributed to Dominion 
cooperation with the United Kingdom.
 329
 In the 1920s the equality of the Commonwealth had 
not yet been established so the Dominions did not have the freedom to fully pursue other options 
without British coordination. During the Depression in the 1930s, technical equality was 
tempered by persisting inequalities within the imperial system, resulting in cooperation as an 
outcome of Dominion interest versus capacity.
330
 
While thus far these concluding remarks have focused on the Dominions, the formula of 
cooperation as the outcome of interest versus capacity also applies to British actions during the 
Depression, as well as during the wider interwar period. In the 1920s the British government 
persistently worked to re-establish freer world trade, but due to the economic outcomes of the 
First World War and the shifting of world financial predominance from London to New York 
was unable to rally both the British domestic and international economies.
331
 Consequently, as 
many authors have argued, with the worsening of the Depression the British government turned 
to an imperial economy out of a lack of alternatives as a backup system in case of world 
economic failure.
332
 In this case, the benefits of empire would automatically accrue in the mother 
                                                          
328
Research Committee of the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association, Britain in 
Recovery, 137-138., TNA: CAB 24/213, CP 228(30).  
329See: “Opening Speech by Mr. Massey,” Imperial Economic Conference of Representatives of Great Britain, The 
Dominions, India and the Colonies and Protectorates, Held October and November 1923: Record of Proceedings 
and Documents (London: HMSO, 1924): 37-45., TNA: CAB 24/213, CP 228(30). 
330
 For example, the Ottawa Conference recognised that the Commonwealth would do its utmost, but the United 
Kingdom necessarily had to lead financial reforms. Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, 1932, 12-13., Miller, 
Britain and the Old Dominions, 41,, Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 34. 
331
 Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 289.  Darwin, The Empire Project, 431.  
332
 SEE Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 296.  Watson, Empire to Commonwealth 18., Cain and Hopkins, 
British Imperialism, 73.  
105 
 
country for structural reasons, allowing Britain to maintain a non-committal stance to the 
imperial economy, all the while benefitting from both that system and freer world trade.
333
 With 
the advent of the Depression and the disappearance of other options, it was not the British lack of 
capacity to have alternatives as it was with the Dominions, but the British lack of capacity to 
successfully re-invigorate the world economy after losing financial predominance in the wake of 
the War.
334
 Thus, a lack of capacity to engage in pre-war economics forced the British 
government to turn to the imperial economy during the Depression. In both cases, a lack of 
capacity to engage with alternative economies encouraged imperial economic cooperation during 
the Depression, regardless of the apparent inclinations of the United Kingdom and the 
Dominions. 
In addition to the structural forces contributing to imperial cooperation during the 
Depression were contextual factors in which the members of the Commonwealth were operating. 
The most significant contextual factor was the scope of the economic crisis. In the 1920s, even as 
the Commonwealth began to emerge and afford the Dominions more independence to pursue 
individual policies, the rhetoric of imperial cooperation was high. At the1923 Imperial Economic 
Conference some Dominion delegates maintained that it was the duty of the Dominions to aid 
Britain in a time of economic hardship.
335
 At the time, the United Kingdom was experiencing a 
significant unemployment crisis in which the structural unemployment of an export based system 
had grown and persisted to the point when all economics were subordinated to the relief of 
unemployment.
336
 The Dominions however, were not nearly so affected by such structural 
unemployment, and were arguably doing quite well as they consolidated new industries 
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developed during the First World War. Consequently, the Dominions in the 1920s were in a 
much more cooperative mood, feeling capable of helping the distressed mother country as they 
themselves were not experiencing the same prolonged economic downturn. This benevolent 
stance did not survive the onset of the Depression in late 1929 and the Dominions became much 
more adamant in asserting their own interests to protect and rebuild their domestic economies, no 
matter the state of Britain.
337
 Thus, in the shift from cooperation to negotiation observed at the 
beginning of this paper, we can see the assertion of self interest as a product of context, with the 
economic conditions of the Dominions dictating their rhetoric of economic cooperation, and the 
level of self-interest incorporated into their policy. It was easy for the Dominions to advocate 
assisting the United Kingdom when they themselves were not in crisis, but the onset of the 
Depression caused a change in rhetoric in the Dominions, which resulted in cooperation not out 
of cost-free benevolence, but for the aforementioned structural reasons of interest versus 
capacity.  
As for the contextual factors affecting Britain, the self-interest brought on by economic 
crisis is evident throughout the 1920s as well as the 1930s. In the prolonged downturn of the 
1920s Britain gladly received the benefits of tariff preferences accorded from the Dominions but 
remained non-committal to wider reciprocating imperial preferences, especially under the 
Labour government which maintained more commitment to social welfare programmes and 
international trade. For example, during the seven month Labour government of 1924, while the 
implementation of the limited imperial preferences agreed to at the 1923 Conference was 
approved, the government also sought to boost unemployment insurance as soon as possible so 
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that it would be implemented to the highest degree before the upcoming election.
338
 Similarly, 
when the Labour government returned to power in 1929, it was not long until they began to 
discuss reforming unemployment insurance and reducing spending restrictions for welfare, all 
the while attempting to minimise engagement with the imperial economy.
339
 Even if the more 
protectionist Conservatives desired comprehensive imperial preference, given the value of free 
trade and the weight of votes connected to free trade profits and the emerging system of social 
welfare, they were not able to effectively pass such measures and therefore only reciprocated 
preferences to the minimal degree established at the 1923 Conference. The majority of British 
policies remained centred on rebuilding more profitable free trade.
340
 During the Depression 
itself, this policy direction remained in place until all other options were exhausted. More 
comprehensive cooperation with the Empire was revisited as a last ditch effort, and this only 
temporarily. Taken together, the economic context of the emergent Commonwealth encouraged 
the Dominions to help support Britain in the 1920s without receiving many reciprocated 
preferences, while Britain accepted those benefits while still remaining committed to world, 
rather than imperial trade. During the Depression when the economic crisis affected all 
Commonwealth members, rather than only Britain, members reflected a higher degree of self 
interest, which coincidentally resulted in increased cooperation due to a lack of alternatives, or 
the lack of capacity to pursue alternatives.  
Although the focus of this paper is predominantly economic, in discussing both structural 
and contextual factors contributing to imperial economic coordination some non-economic 
factors must also be mentioned. These factors arguably played a lesser role in the imperial 
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economic response to the Depression, but they nonetheless played a role in the context of those 
policies. 
One such consideration is politics, particularly in terms of international relations and the 
threat of war. In this area, the formula of cooperation as a product of interest versus capacity also 
holds true. For example, in terms of imperial defence Britain continued to pay the majority of 
costs for imperial defence, especially for the upkeep of the Royal Navy, which has been argued 
to be the backbone of the Empire.
341
 Due to the structural legacy of the Empire, while the 
Dominions were beginning to develop their own naval forces they could not reasonably expect to 
defend themselves without help from Britain, particularly Australia and New Zealand, which 
faced concerns of Japanese aggression in the Pacific.
342
 From the point of view of Britain, a self-
sustaining imperial economic system would give the United Kingdom a secure source of food 
and resources in the case of war, in addition to a large reserve of imperial troops.
343
 These 
potentially symbiotic needs were the product of colonial structures and encouraged cooperation 
between Britain and the Dominions in order to ensure the best possible strategic situation for the 
Empire. The 1920s and even more so the 1930s were a troublesome time in the world political 
sphere, and the fear of war and radicalism only mounted with the onset of the Depression. The 
context of the interwar period demonstrates not only a structural obligation for imperial 
cooperation but also a mutual interest in doing so, as for reasons of capacity no parts of the 
Commonwealth could be independently successful in the event of war. The result was that, as 
international relations deteriorated and the imperial preferential economic system began to lapse 
in the late 1930s, the place of economic coordination in conference discussion was taken by talks 
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on increased defence coordination and international appeasement.
 344
 The main principles 
adopted by the 1937 Imperial Conference illustrate this shift in the focus of imperial 
coordination.
 345 
Of the resolutions only two were economic, and both of these arguably fit the 
persisting free-trade agenda of the British government. The rest of the discussion shifted to more 
politico-military concerns, the preponderance of which notably outweighed economic discourse, 
not only in the final resolutions of the conference, but also throughout conference discussion.
346
 
Defence coordination was an area in which imperial cooperation was mutually beneficial as the 
threat of war increased in the 1930s, and encouraged general Commonwealth cooperation. 
Defence cooperation did not necessarily mean increased economic cooperation, but it was 
nonetheless a factor pushing Britain and the Dominions together during the interwar period, and 
is therefore contextually relevant to imperial relations at the time.
347
 
While the late 1930s showed a degree of political convergence in defence matters, on a 
contrary note, in the realm of constitutional politics there was a tendency for divergence within 
the emergent Commonwealth. As the Commonwealth was established and the Dominions began 
to receive increased diplomatic and legal privileges and capabilities, the imperial structure still 
initially left the Dominions without the capacity to conduct independent foreign relations 
whereas Britain could do so without consulting the Dominion on its decisions. In cases when 
Dominion opinions were at odds with British foreign policies (such as the Chanak crisis in 1922-
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23), this was the source of no small antagonism within the emergent Commonwealth and   
arguably pushed the Dominions to seek more political independence. Consequently, 
constitutional developments could also be seen as driving the Dominions and Britain apart 
during the interwar period.  
Political issues, particularly dealing with constitutional and defence matters as in the 
above examples, represented both push and pull factors on imperial cohesion in the interwar 
period and are important context to imperial economic cooperation. In both of these cases 
however, the formula of cooperation as a product of self interest versus capacity holds true, with 
all parties cooperating more when it was in their best interest to do so.  
When noting additional non-economic factors, it is also important to note the cultural 
aspects of the Commonwealth. At all imperial conferences the rhetoric of unity and common 
British heritage was used to frame discussion and to preface meetings. Arguably the more British 
the Dominion, the higher degree of cooperation they sought with the mother country, whereas 
the Dominions with larger minority populations such as Canada with French Canadians, or South 
Africa with Boers, tended to be more divergent from Britain. This common cultural component 
was an ever-present background to imperial debates and cooperative measures. Although it 
seems that cultural considerations were consistently subordinated to other concerns, it is 
nonetheless another notable non-economic push and pull factor that informed the context of 
imperial economic cooperation during the interwar period.  
Having even cursorily considered some non-economic factors such as the politics of 
defence, constitutional development, and cultural considerations, we find an increasingly 
complex picture of the interwar Empire beyond the scope of this paper. Together these push and 
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pull forces offered impetus both for and against increased imperial coordination and 
interdependence. Yet in each case there is a shared thread of national self interest, with Britain 
and each of the Dominions, pursuing the best for themselves, rather than for the Empire as a 
whole, particularly after the start of the Depression. Hence, after the Depression began and 
radicalism increased in Europe, out of self-interest Britain and the Dominions increasingly 
cooperated on defence matters which neither could uphold independently. Similarly, out of self-
interest the Dominions strove for political independence, which Britain incrementally granted to 
avoid antagonism between the Dominions and the mother country. Many historians have argued 
that this incremental independence in exchange for goodwill was just enough to keep the 
Commonwealth together during the turbulent interwar period.
348
 Culturally, most members 
emphasised their Britishness to strengthen their respective national images, save for the 
Dominions with more minority populations, which tried to strike a balance between their 
domestic politics and a greater imperial identity as nationalism grew in the 1930s.  These non-
economic factors provide context for imperial economic cooperation in the interwar period and 
help explain the gap between rhetoric and reality which sometimes emerges within documents 
concerning economic policy. Each British and Dominion government weighed these factors 
while forming policies, often resulting in a compromise between proposed policies in one area 
and the complications of another (such as economic realities pushing the Commonwealth 
together, while constitutional politics pulled it apart). In addition to providing contextual 
information as well as an explanation for disparity between rhetoric and actual policy, these non-
economic considerations also provide further evidence that the members of the Commonwealth 
were prone to operating out of national self-interest. This evidence reinforces the findings of this 
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thesis that Commonwealth economic cooperation was the outcome of member interest versus 
capacity.  
The economic cooperation of the emergent Commonwealth as a product of member-state 
interest versus capacity has implications not only for how we view interwar imperial relations, 
but also for the study of supranational organisations, and how such organisations function under 
the duress of economic crises. If one defines a supranational organisation as a community of 
member states that must cooperate to achieve the goals of the wider organisation, the emergent 
Commonwealth can be styled as a proto-supranational organisation, which conformed to this 
definition in principle, but was restricted by lingering imperial structures. This study has shown 
that in the case of the Commonwealth, economic crisis enhanced member self interest, but that 
self interest nonetheless led to cooperation due to the lingering structures of a colonial style-
economy. These results have important implications for our understanding of modern 
supranational organisations such as the European Union, which operates with a common 
economic system. If the results of this study are extrapolated to supranational organisations more 
generally, it is clear that large-scale economic crises are inherently divisive to such 
organisations. However, structural ties may render cooperation more likely, seemingly against 
the self-interested and therefore divergent tendencies of member states. The further study of 
Commonwealth interactions, both generally and regarding any non-economic subjects such as 
defence coordination or cultural ties has great potential to broaden our understanding of modern 
supranational organisations. The exploration of the heritage of supranational organisations, as 
well as how they function in different areas of policy, and in the context of various global events, 
can widen our understanding of state interactions above the national level. This area of research 
is increasingly relevant as globalisation promotes the establishment of supranational 
113 
 
organisations to manage ever-larger networks of trade and international cooperation, yet does so 
at a pace which often makes the historicization of such organisations impractical. By studying 
the proto-supranational phase of organisations such as the Commonwealth, this area of research 
has the potential to greatly broaden our understanding of the operation of these organisations as 
they become increasingly prevalent in the contemporary world. 
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